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Abstract—We introduce a tunable measure for information
leakage called maximal α-leakage. This measure quantifies the
maximal gain of an adversary in inferring any (potentially
random) function of a dataset from a release of the data. The
inferential capability of the adversary is, in turn, quantified by
a class of adversarial loss functions that we introduce as α-
loss, α ∈ [1,∞) ∪ {∞}. The choice of α determines the specific
adversarial action and ranges from refining a belief (about any
function of the data) for α = 1 to guessing the most likely value
for α =∞ while refining the αth moment of the belief for α in
between. Maximal α-leakage then quantifies the adversarial gain
under α-loss over all possible functions of the data. In particular,
for the extremal values of α = 1 and α = ∞, maximal α-
leakage simplifies to mutual information and maximal leakage,
respectively. For α ∈ (1,∞) this measure is shown to be the
Arimoto channel capacity of order α. We show that maximal α-
leakage satisfies data processing inequalities and a sub-additivity
property thereby allowing for a weak composition result. Building
upon these properties, we use maximal α-leakage as the privacy
measure and study the problem of data publishing with privacy
guarantees, wherein the utility of the released data is ensured
via a hard distortion constraint. Unlike average distortion, hard
distortion provides a deterministic guarantee of fidelity. We show
that under a hard distortion constraint, for α > 1 the optimal
mechanism is independent of α, and therefore, the resulting
optimal tradeoff is the same for all values of α > 1. Finally,
the tunability of maximal α-leakage as a privacy measure is also
illustrated for binary data with average Hamming distortion as
the utility measure.
Index Terms—Mutual information, maximal leakage, maximal
α-leakage, Sibson mutual information, Arimoto mutual informa-
tion, f -divergence, privacy-utility tradeoff, hard distortion.
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The measure and control of private information leakage
is a recognized objective in communications, information
theory, and computer science. Modern cryptography [1]–[3],
for example, aims at designing and analyzing security systems
that are believed to be impervious to computationally bounded
adversaries. Alternatively, information-theoretic security stud-
ies settings where an asymmetry of information between an
adversary and the legitimate parties (e.g., the wiretap channel
[4]–[6]) can be exploited to guarantee that no private infor-
mation is leaked regardless of computational assumptions. An
adversary that only observes the output of a (computationally)
secure cipher or cannot overcome the information asymmetry
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in a wiretap-like setting does not, for all practical purposes,
pose a privacy risk.
However, modern applications such as online data sharing,
social networks, cloud-based services, and mobile computing
have significantly increased the number of ways in which
private information can leak. Services that require a user to
disclose data in order to receive utility inevitably incur a pri-
vacy risk through unwanted inferences. For example, sensitive
information such as political preference, medical conditions,
and identity can be reliably estimated from movie ratings
[7], online shopping patterns, [8], and via deanonymization
and tracking of interactions in social network data [9], [10],
respectively. Moreover, practical implementations of crypto-
graphic schemes are susceptible to so-called “side-channel
attacks,” where sensitive information leaks through unexpected
channels. For example, a malicious application may get timing
characteristics [11], [12]. In these examples, an adversary that
observes information leaked through a side-channel can more
reliably infer private data, such as a key or a plaintext.
Several (often overlapping) definitions of pri-
vacy/information leakage have been proposed over the
past decade. The most widely adopted measure is differential
privacy (DP) [13], [14], which was introduced within the
context of querying databases. DP seeks to ensure that changes
in the database entries do not significantly influence the value
of a query. A variety of information-theoretic measures
have also been proposed as leakage measures. Foremost
among them is mutual information (MI): its use as a privacy
measure in [15]–[24] is inspired by the common appearance
of MI as an operationally-meaningful quantity throughout
the literature on communication systems. In a similar vein,
divergence-based quantities such as total variation distance
between the prior and posterior distributions [25] have also
been proposed as leakage measures. Information-theoretic
measures have been studied in the DP community via Re´nyi
differential privacy which is based on Re´nyi divergence [26]
that allow relaxing the original definition of DP in order
to enable better utility guarantees. However, the gamut of
information-theoretic leakage measures proposed to address
the privacy problem do not yet have clear operational
meanings or adversarial models in their definitions.
More recently, information-theoretic formulations have been
introduced to capture privacy against a “guessing” adversary.
Here, privacy is measured in terms of an adversary’s gain in
guessing the private information after observing disclosed data.
For example, Asoodeh et al. use the probability of correctly
guessing to measure privacy [27]; and Issa et al. introduce
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2maximal leakage (MaxL), which quantifies the maximal log-
arithmic gain in the probability of correctly guessing any
arbitrary function of the original data from released data [28].
A related line of work includes [29]–[31], where security
is quantified in terms of the expected number of guesses
(or moments thereof) required by an adversary to correctly
identify a quantity of interest (e.g., a password or a transmitted
codeword).
This work builds upon the abovementioned efforts to opera-
tionally motivate measures and presents a larger class of mean-
ingful information-theoretic measures that can be operationally
motivated in the privacy setting. To this end, we introduce a
tunable loss function, namely α-loss (1 ≤ α ≤ ∞), to capture
adversarial actions. In particular, for α = 1 and α = ∞ the
loss function simplifies to the logarithmic loss (log-loss) [32]–
[34] and the probability of error1, respectively. The choice of
the loss function captures the inferential action of an adversary.
Specifically, the adversarial action, henceforth referred to as
inference, involves refining a posterior belief of one or more
sensitive features. Adversarial gain of a computationally un-
bounded adversary is then simply the decrease in (inferential)
loss on average as a result of a data release.
We use the α-loss function to derive two new privacy
measures called α-leakage and maximal α-leakage. Specifi-
cally, α-leakage quantifies an adversary’s gain in inferring a
specific private attribute in the dataset; in contrast, maximal
α-leakage quantifies an adversary’s gain in inferring any
arbitrary attribute of the dataset. In particular, maximal α-
leakage includes MI and MaxL as special cases for α = 1
and α = ∞, respectively. This approach allows us to show
that MaxL can be interpreted in terms of an adversary seeking
to minimize the 0-1 loss function [33], [35] (α =∞), i.e., the
adversary makes a hard decision via a maximum likelihood
estimator. On the other hand, we show that when MI is used
as a leakage measure (α = 1), the underlying loss function
is the log-loss, that models a (soft decision) belief-refining
adversary. In addition to what the adversary observes (e.g.,
released census dataset or information via a side-channel),
the adversary may also have access to other correlated side-
information (e.g., voter record database or individual personal
information in side-channel attacks); generalizing α-leakage
and maximal α-leakage to model such side-information is
indeed possible as recently shown by the authors in [36];
however, this generalization is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our proposed measures can be applied to the aforemen-
tioned privacy and side-channel settings. In most non-trivial
settings of data publishing, there is a fundamental privacy-
utility tradeoff (PUT): on the one hand, releasing data “as is”
can lead to unwanted inferences of private information. On the
other hand, perturbing or limiting the released data reduces
its quality. We quantify PUTs for two types of data models:
one in which the entire dataset is sensitive (as illustrated in
Fig. 1a) and the other in which only a subset of the dataset is
sensitive (as illustrated in Fig. 1b). Throughout this paper, we
use X to denote the original data that will be released as Y
1Note that the probability of error for a maximum likelihood estimator is
exactly the 0-1 loss [33], [35].
via a randomized mapping; X may be entirely sensitive as in
Fig. 1a, or it may be separate from the sensitive features S as in
Fig. 1b. The variable U represents a specific sensitive feature
of the dataset that the adversary is interested in learning.
Examples of datasets wherein the entire data is sensitive
include data collected by smart devices such as smartphone
sensors, movie recommendation systems, where it is hard to
know a priori which aspect of the data ought to be identified
as sensitive. In contrast, examples of datasets with clearly
defined sensitive features include census and other datasets
that explicitly include personally identifiable information.
The exact nature of the PUT depends on exactly how
both privacy and utility are measured. Towards an under-
standing of our new privacy measures, we consider PUTs
in which (maximal) α-leakage is the privacy measure, and
we study several options for utility measure. In general, a
meaningful utility measure (between the original and released
data) should require the released data to provide either (i)
average-case guarantees on fidelity [18], [25], [27], [37], [38];
or (ii) worst-case guarantees on fidelity. Indeed, requirement
(i) lends itself to modeling with a large class of expected
value constraints including average distortion constraints and
is now well studied in information-theoretical privacy via
a variety of measures such as Hamming distortion, square
error and Kullback–Leibler divergence [23], [38]–[41]. We
note that average distortion constraints are also well studied
in rate-distortion theory. To capture utility requirement (ii),
we introduce a hard distortion measure which constrains the
privacy mechanism so that the distortion between original
and released datasets is bounded with probability 1. Such an
approach has also been studied in rate-distortion theory as a
potential distortion measure (see, for example, [42] for the use
of per symbol distortion constraints). In addition, compared
to average-case distortion constraints [23], [38]–[41], a hard
distortion measure is quite stringent but allows the data curator
to make specific, deterministic guarantees on the fidelity of the
released dataset relative to the original. Such a deterministic
guarantee can lead to more accurate statistical estimators,
e.g., the empirical distribution estimation for publicly released
datasets such as the census.
A. Contributions and Organization
The main contributions of this paper include:
• We introduce a tunable loss function, namely α-loss
(1 ≤ α ≤ ∞), which captures log-loss and 0-1 loss,
respectively, for extremal values of α = 1 and ∞,
respectively (Sec. III-A).
• Based on α-loss, we define two operational measures of
information leakage: α-leakage and maximal α-leakage,
and show that: (i) α-leakage equals to Arimoto mutual
information of order α [43], [44]; and (ii) maximal α-
leakage equals to MI for α = 1 and Arimoto channel
capacity [44] of order α for α > 1. Note that maximal α-
leakage captures MI and MaxL at the extremal values of
α (Sec. III-B). The proofs of these results rely on the fact
that maximizing either the Arimoto MI or the Sibson MI
[45] over the input distribution yields the same quantity,
the Arimoto channel capacity.
3?
(a) The privacy protection for entirely sensitive datasets. (b) The privacy protection for datasets with non-sensitive and sensitive data.
Fig. 1: Two privacy-guaranteed data publishing scenarios: (i) the left figure shows the privacy protection for entirely sensitive
datasets, where X and Y represent the original and released data. An adversary intends to infer a function U of X from Y ,
and Uˆ is the adversary’s estimation of U . Generally, the function U is unknown to the data curator/provider; (ii) the right
figure shows the privacy protection for datasets consisting of non-sensitive and sensitive data, where X and S represent the
non-sensitive and sensitive data in original dataset, respectively, and Y is the released version of X . The adversary intends to
infer S from Y , and Sˆ is the adversary’s estimation of S.
• Inspired by the fact that maximal α-leakage equals to the
Arimoto channel capacity, we introduce a broader class
of information-leakage measures based on f -divergences,
which capture maximal α-leakage as a special case (Sec.
III-C);
• We prove that maximal α-leakage satisfies several use-
ful properties, including: (i) quasi-convexity, (ii) data-
processing inequalities: post-processing inequality and
linkage inequality, (iii) sub-additivity (iv) additivity for
memoryless mappings (Sec. IV).
• In the context of privacy-guaranteed data publishing
subject to a hard distortion utility constraint on data, we
solve the resulting PUT problems exactly for maximal
α-leakage as well as its f -divergence-based variants
(Sec. V-A). For α-leakage, which restricts leakage about
specific sensitive data as shown in Fig. 1b, we provide
an inner bound of the optimal PUT (Sec. V-B). In Sec.
VI, we illustrate these results via two examples.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use capital letters to represent discrete random variables,
and the corresponding capital calligraphic and lower-case
letters represent their finite supports and the elements of the
supports, respectively. For example, for a random variable
X , its support is X with any possible realization x ∈ X .
In addition, we use log to represent the natural logarithm,
and [a, b] to indicate the set of integers from a to b. We
use | · | to indicate the cardinality of a set, e.g., |X |, and
‖ · ‖p to represent the p-norm of a vector, e.g., for α ≥ 1,
‖PX‖α , (
∑
x∈X PX(x)
α)
1
α .
We begin by reviewing Re´nyi entropy and divergence [46],
[47].
Definition 1. Given a distribution PX , the Re´nyi entropy of
order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) is defined as
Hα(PX) =
1
1− α log
∑
x∈X
PX(x)
α,
=
α
1− α log ‖PX‖α, (α ≥ 1).
(1)
(2)
Let QX be a distribution over the support of PX . The Re´nyi
divergence (between PX and QX ) of order α ∈ (0, 1)∪(1,∞)
is defined as
Dα(PX‖QX) = 1
α− 1 log
(∑
x∈X
PX(x)
α
QX(x)α−1
)
. (3)
Both of the two quantities are defined by their continuous
extensions for α = 1 and ∞. Specifically, for α = ∞, the
two quantities are given by
H∞(PX) = min
x
log
1
PX(x)
, (4)
which is called min-entropy, and
D∞(PX‖QX) = logmax
x
PX(x)
QX(x)
. (5)
For α = 1, the Re´nyi entropy and divergence reduce to
Shannon entropy and Kullback-Leibler divergence, respec-
tively [43].
The α-leakage and maximal α-leakage measures can be
expressed in terms of Sibson MI [45] and Arimoto MI [44].
These quantities generalize the usual notion of MI. We review
these definitions next.
Definition 2. Let discrete random variables (X,Y ) ∼ PX,Y
with PX and PY |X as the marginal and conditional distribu-
tions, respectively, and QY be an arbitrary distribution over
the finite support Y . The Sibson mutual information of order
α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) is defined as
ISα(X;Y ) , inf
QY
Dα(PX,Y ‖PX ×QY )
=
α
α− 1 log
∑
y∈Y
(∑
x∈X
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)α
) 1
α
.
(6)
(7)
The Arimoto mutual information of order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞)
is defined as
IAα(X;Y ), Hα(X)−HAα(X|Y ) (8)
=
α
α− 1 log
∑
y∈Y
( ∑
x∈X
PX,Y (x, y)
α
) 1
α
( ∑
x∈X
PX(x)α
) 1
α
, (9)
4=
α
α− 1 log
∑
y∈Y
‖PX,Y (·, y)‖α
‖PX‖α , (α ≥ 1)(10)
where HAα(X|Y ) is Arimoto conditional entropy of X given
Y defined as
HAα(X|Y ) =
α
1− α log
∑
y∈Y
(∑
x∈X
PX,Y (x, y)
α
) 1
α
. (11)
All of these quantities are defined by their continuous extension
for α = 1 or ∞.
Note that for α = 1, both Sibson and Arimoto MIs reduce
to Shannon’s MI; however, for α =∞, the Sibson MI is
IS∞(X;Y ) = log
∑
y
max
x
PY |X(y|x), (12)
and the Arimoto MI is given by
IA∞(X;Y ) = log
∑
y
max
x
PX,Y (x, y)
max
x
PX(x)
. (13)
The two measures of information generalize Shannon’s MI and
have a number of interesting and useful properties in various
problems [43]–[45], [48].
III. TUNABLE LOSS FUNCTION AND INFORMATION
LEAKAGE MEASURES
Information leakage of a data release can be viewed as an
increase in adversarial inference as a result of the data release.
This inference performance can be precisely characterized by
a loss function that an adversary minimizes. In this section,
we introduce a tunable loss function, namely α-loss for α ∈
[1,∞], to captures a computationally unbounded adversary’s
inference in refining a posterior belief of one or more sensitive
features from a data release, and introduce two tunable mea-
sures, called α-leakage and maximal α-leakage, respectively,
to measure the corresponding information leakages due to the
data release.
A. α-Loss Function
For a Markov chain X − Y − Xˆ , let Xˆ be an estimator
of X and PXˆ|Y be a strategy for estimating X from Y . We
denote the probability of correctly estimating X = x given
Y = y as PXˆ|Y (x|y). The estimation strategy PXˆ|Y is selected
in order to minimize an expected loss measure. Denoting the
loss function by `(x, y, PXˆ|Y ), the expected loss is given by
E
[
`
(
X,Y, PXˆ|Y
)]
.
One formulation of the loss function is the probability of
incorrectly guessing given by
`0−1(x, y, PXˆ|Y ) = 1− PXˆ|Y (x|y), (14)
such that the expected loss E
[
`0−1
(
X,Y, PXˆ|Y
)]
is the ex-
pected probability of error. Here, the optimal strategy P ?
Xˆ|Y
is the standard maximal posterior (MAP) estimator given by
P ?
Xˆ|Y (x|y) =
{
1, x = argmax
x∈X
PX|Y (x|y)
0, otherwise
, (15)
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Fig. 2: The plot of α-loss as a function of p. Note that the p ∈
[0.001, 1] represents the probability of correctly guessing, i.e.,
p = PXˆ|Y (x|y) with an observation Y = y and p = PXˆ(x)
without any observation.
which makes the loss `0−1(x, y, P ?Xˆ|Y ) be either 0 or 1,
and therefore, called 0-1 loss in the literature [33], [35].
The corresponding expected loss E
[
`0−1
(
X,Y, P ?
Xˆ|Y
)]
is the
minimal expected probability of error.
To measure the uncertainty for the strategy PXˆ|Y , the log-
loss (used, for example, in [32]–[34], [49]) is given by
`log(x, y, PXˆ|Y ) = log
1
PXˆ|Y (x|y)
. (16)
The expected loss in this case is the conditional cross-entropy,
given by
E
[
`log(X,Y, PXˆ|Y )
]
=
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y) log
1
PXˆ|Y (x|y)
, (17)
=H(X|Y ) +
∑
y
PY (y)D(PX|Y=y‖PXˆ|Y=y). (18)
Therefore, the optimal strategy is the true posterior distribution
of X given Y , i.e., P ?
Xˆ|Y = PX|Y , which makes the expected
loss in (18) become the conditional entropy H(X|Y ). That is,
the minimal expected log-loss is the true conditional entropy.
Note that both the 0-1 loss and log-loss functions are de-
creasing in the probability of correctly estimation PXˆ|Y (x|y).
Specifically, for PXˆ|Y (x|y) = 1, both the values of 0-1 loss
and α-loss are 0, and for PXˆ|Y (x|y) = 0, the values of 0-1
loss and log-loss become 1 and ∞, respectively. To allow a
continuous quantification of the loss for PXˆ|Y (x|y) = 0 from
1 to ∞, we formally define a tunable loss function, namely
α-loss, as follows.
Definition 3 (α-loss). Let random variables X , Y and Xˆ form
a Markov chain X − Y − Xˆ , where Xˆ is an estimator of X .
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Fig. 3: The optimal strategy in (23) for different α. Note that
the magenta circles represent the true conditional probability
PX|Y=y , which is a binomial distribution with parameters
(n, p) = (20, 0.5).
The α-loss of the strategy PXˆ|Y for estimating X from Y is
`α(x, y, PXˆ|Y ) =
α
α− 1
(
1− PXˆ|Y (x|y)
α−1
α
)
, (19)
where α ∈ (1,∞). It is defined by its continuous extension for
α = 1 and α =∞, respectively, and is given by
`1(x, y, PXˆ|Y ) = limα→1
`α(x, y, PXˆ|Y )= log
1
PXˆ|Y (x|y)
,
`∞(x, y, PXˆ|Y )= limα→∞ `α(x, y, PXˆ|Y )=1−PXˆ|Y (x|y).
(20)
(21)
Note that for α = 1, the expression in (20) follows directly
from the L’Hoˆpital’s rule and α-loss becomes the log-loss in
(16); and for α =∞, the loss in (21) is exactly the probability
of error in (14), which becomes 0-1 loss for MAP estimators.
Fig. 2 plots the α-loss function in (19) for different values of
α. From Fig. 2, we observe that α-loss function is decreasing
and convex in the probability of correctly guessing.
Lemma 1. For 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, the minimal expected α-loss is
given by
min
PXˆ|Y
E
[
`α(X,Y, PXˆ|Y )
]
=
{
α
α−1
(
1− exp ( 1−αα HAα(X|Y ))) , α > 1
H(X|Y ), α = 1 , (22)
with the optimal estimation strategy given by 2
P ?
Xˆ|Y (x|y) =
PXˆ|Y (x|y)α∑
x∈X
PXˆ|Y (x|y)α
. (23)
A detailed proof is in Appendix A. Note that in (22),
2Note that if there are more than one realization sharing the same maximal
posterior belief, for α = ∞ the optimal strategy in (23) will output these
most likely values with the same probability.
HAα (X|Y ) is Arimoto conditional entropy of X given Y in
(11). For α =∞, the expression of HA∞(X|Y ) is
HA∞(X|Y ) = log
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PX|Y (x|y), (24)
such that exp
(
HA∞(X|Y )
)
is the maximal expected probabil-
ity of correctly guessing X from Y . Therefore, for α =∞, the
minimal expected α-loss is the minimal expected probability
of error. In addition, the optimal estimation strategy in (23)
becomes the true posterior distribution of X for α = 1 and
the MAP estimator for α =∞, respectively.
Example 1. Let the conditional probability distribution of X
given Y = y be a binomial distribution with parameters
(n, p) = (20, 0.5), i.e., PX|Y (x|y) =
(
20
x
)
0.5x0.520−x for
x ∈ [0, 20]. Fig. 3 shows the optimal strategies in (23) for
different values of α. We observe from Fig. 3 that as α grows
from 1 to ∞, the optimal strategy gradually eliminates the
less likely values of X (given y) and transforms from the true
posterior distribution to the MAP estimator.
B. α-Leakage and Maximal α-Leakage
Let X and Y represent the original data and released data,
respectively, and let U represent an arbitrary (potentially ran-
dom) function of X that the observer (a curious or malicious
user of the released data Y ) is interested in learning. In [28],
Issa et al. introduced MaxL to quantify the maximal gain in
an adversary’s ability of guessing U after observing Y . We
review the definition below.
Definition 4 ( [28, Def. 1]). Given a joint distribution PX,Y
on finite alphabets, the maximal leakage from X to Y is
LMaxL(X → Y ) , sup
U−X−Y
log
max
PUˆ|Y
E
[
PUˆ |Y (U |Y )
]
max
u
PU (u)
, (25)
where Uˆ represents an estimator taking values from the same
arbitrary finite support as U .
Note that the numerator of the logarithmic term in (25) is
the maximal expected probability of correctly guessing U with
Y given by
max
PUˆ|Y
E
[
PUˆ |Y (U |Y )
]
= max
u
∑
y
PY (y)PU |Y (u|y), (26)
which is exactly the complement of the minimal expected 0-1
loss in guessing U with Y . Similarly, the denominator is the
complement of the minimal expected 0-1 loss in guessing U
without Y . Therefore, MaxL is a leakage measure related to
0-1 loss in (14).
In addition, in Def. 4, U represents any (possibly ran-
dom) function of X . The numerator represents the maximal
probability of correctly guessing U based on Y , while the
denominator represents the maximal probability of correctly
guessing U without knowing Y . Thus, MaxL quantifies the
maximal logarithmic gain in guessing any possible function
of X when an adversary has access to Y .
Analogously to the derivation of MaxL from 0-1 loss, we
introduce α-leakage and maximal α-leakage based on α-loss
6(under the assumptions of discrete random variables and finite
supports). The formal definitions are as follows.
Definition 5 (α-Leakage). Given a joint distribution PX,Y and
an estimator Xˆ with the same support as X , the α-leakage
from X to Y is defined as
Lα(X → Y ) , α
α− 1 log
max
PXˆ|Y
E
[
PXˆ|Y (X|Y )
α−1
α
]
max
PXˆ
E
[
PXˆ(X)
α−1
α
] , (27)
for α ∈ (1,∞) and by the continuous extension of (27) for
α = 1 and ∞.
Note that for any specific function U of X , the joint prob-
ability distribution of X and the U is known, and therefore,
α-leakage can also be used to measure the the inference gain
in inferring the specific function U from the released data
Y . In addition, the two maximizations in the numerator and
denominator of the logarithmic ratio in (27) imply the optimal
adversarial actions in the sense of minimizing the expected α-
loss in Lemma 1. Therefore, it limits the inference gain that an
adversary can obtain by minimizing the expected α-loss, no
matter the adversary has prior knowledge (i.e., the probability
distribution of the original data) of the original data or not.
Whereas α-leakage captures how much an adversary can
learn about X (or a specific function of X) from Y , we also
wish to quantify the information leaked about any function
of X through Y . To this end, we define maximal α-leakage
below.
Definition 6 (Maximal α-Leakage). Given a joint distribution
PX,Y on finite alphabets X ×Y , the maximal α-leakage from
X to Y is defined as
Lmaxα (X → Y ) , sup
U−X−Y
Lα(U ;Y ), (28)
where 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, and U represents any function of X and
takes values from an arbitrary finite alphabet.
Note that for α ≥ 1,
max
PUˆ|Y
E
[
PUˆ |Y (U |Y )
α−1
α
]
=1− α− 1
α
min
PUˆ|Y
E
[
`α(U, Y, PUˆ |Y )
]
. (29)
Thus, there is a similar connection between maximal α-
leakage and α-loss (in Def. 3) as that observed in (26) between
MaxL and 0-1 loss, and maximal α-leakage quantifies an
adversary’s capability to infer any function of data X from
the released Y .
Making use of the result in Lemma 1, the following theorem
simplifies the expression of α-leakage in (27).
Theorem 1. For 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, α-leakage defined in (27)
simplifies to
Lα(X → Y ) = IAα(X;Y ). (30)
From (29) and Lemma 1, we simplify the scaled logarithm
of the ratio in (27) to Arimoto MI. A detailed proof is in
Appendix B, where we show that Arimoto conditional entropy
and Re´nyi entropy capture the inference uncertainties of an
adversary for knowing Y or not, respectively, and α-leakage
measures the decrease in the inference uncertainty by knowing
Y .
Making use of the conclusion in Thm. 1, the following
theorem gives equivalent expressions for maximal α-leakage.
Note that in the following theorem we use the well-known
equivalence of the supremums of Sibson and Arimoto MIs
[43, Thm. 5].
Theorem 2. For 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, the maximal α-leakage defined
in (28) simplifies to
Lmaxα (X → Y )
=
 supPX˜ I
S
α(X˜;Y ) = sup
PX˜
IAα(X˜;Y ), 1 < α ≤ ∞
I(X;Y ), α = 1
(31a)
(31b)
where PX˜ is a probability distribution over the support of PX .
Note that maximal α-leakage is essentially the Arimoto
channel capacity (with a support-set constrained input distribu-
tion) for α > 1 [44], which is used to characterize probabilities
of decoding error for scenarios in which transmission rates are
higher than channel capacity. The limit of maximal α-leakage
for α = 1 gives the Shannon channel capacity. Recall that the
limit of α-loss in (19) leads to the log-loss (for α = 1) and
0-1 loss (for α = ∞) functions, respectively. Consequently,
for α = 1 and ∞, maximal α-leakage simplifies to MI and
MaxL, respectively.
A detailed proof for Thm. 2 is in Appendix C. We summa-
rize key steps in the proof as follows: by applying Thm. 1,
we write maximal α-leakage as
Lmaxα (X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y
IAα(U ;Y ) α ∈ [1,∞]. (32)
For α = 1, Arimoto MI is simply the Shannon’s MI, and com-
bining with the data processing inequalities, (32) simplifies to
I(X;Y ). Note that for α > 1, Arimoto MI does not satisfy
data processing inequalities. By using the facts that Arimoto
MI and Sibson MI have the same supremum [43, Thm. 5]
and that Sibson MI satisfies data processing inequalities [43,
Thm. 3], we limit the supremum in (32) by supPX˜ I
S
α(X˜;Y ),
and then, show that the upper bound supPX˜ I
S
α(X˜;Y ) can be
achieved by a specific U with H(X|U) = 0.
Example 2. Given a binary channel
PY |X =
[
1− ρ1 ρ1
ρ2 1− ρ2
]
, (33)
where ρ1, ρ2 ∈ [0, 1] are the crossover probabilities, maximal
α-leakage in (31) is given by
Lmaxα (X → Y )
=
α
α− 1 log
(∣∣∣(1− ρ1)α(1− ρ2)α − ρα1 ρα2 ∣∣∣ 1α
·
(∣∣∣(1− ρ2)α−ρα1 ∣∣∣ 11−α+ ∣∣∣(1− ρ1)α−ρα2 ∣∣∣ 11−α)α−1α
)
.(34)
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Fig. 4: The values of maximal α-leakage for binary channels
determined by a pair of crossover probabilities (ρ1, ρ2).
If ρ1 = ρ2, (34) simplifies to
Lmaxα (X → Y ) =
1
α− 1 log ((1− ρ1)
α + ρα1 ) + log 2, (35)
which is exactly the α-leakage for the binary symmetric
channel with the uniform input distribution. Fig. 4 plots the
values of maximal α-leakage for example channels where
ρ1 = ρ2 and ρ1 6= ρ2, and shows that the ordering of leakages
for the two channels varies with α.
C. Leakage Measures Based on f -Divergence
We introduce two classes of information leakages derived
from f -divergence, called f -leakage and maximal f -leakage.
The f -leakage depends on the distribution of original data,
and in contrast, maximal f -divergence only depends on the
support of original data. We also show the relation between
the f -divergence-based measures and maximal α-leakage for
α = 1 and α > 1, respectively.
Recall that for a convex function f : R+ → R such that
f(1) = 0, an f -divergence Df is a measure of the distance
between two distributions given by
Df (PY ‖QY ) =
∑
y
Q(y) f
(
P (y)
Q(y)
)
. (36)
Definition 7. Given a joint distribution PX,Y = PY |XPX and
a f -divergence Df , the f -leakage is defined as
Lf (X → Y ) = inf
QY
Df (PX,Y ‖PX ×QY ), (37)
and the maximal f -leakage is defined as
Lmaxf (X → Y ) = sup
PX˜
inf
QY
Df (PY |XPX˜‖PX˜ ×QY ), (38)
where PX˜ is a distribution over the support of PX .
Note that in Definition 7, maximal f -leakage (Lmaxf ) de-
pends on the distribution of X only through its support. In
contrast, f -leakage (Lf ) depends fully on the distribution of
X . Both measures depend on the chosen mechanism PY |X .
Recall that for α = 1, maximal α-leakage is MI. Therefore,
it is a special case of Lf (X → Y ) in (37) with f(t) = t log t.
Furthermore, for α > 1, maximal α-leakage has a one-to-one
relationship with a special case of Lmaxf in (38) for f given by
fα(t) =
1
α− 1(t
α − 1), (39)
such that Df is the Hellinger divergence of order α [50]. The
following lemma makes this observation precise.
Lemma 2. For discrete random variables X and Y , the
maximal α-leakage (α > 1) from X to Y can be written
as
Lmaxα (X → Y ) = 1α−1 log
(
1 + (α− 1)Lmaxfα (X → Y )
)
,
(40)
where Lmaxfα (X → Y ) indicates a set of maximal f -leakage in
(38) defined from the function given by (39).
A detailed proof is in Appendix D. Note that substituting
fα defined in (39) into (36), we can obtain the Hellinger
divergences of order α > 1. Thus, from Lemma 2, for
α > 1, maximal α-leakage can be transformed to the maximal
f -leakage based on Hellinger divergences via a one-to-one
mapping. In this sense, maximal α-leakage is a special case
of maximal f -leakage.
IV. PROPERTIES OF MAXIMAL α-LEAKAGE
Thm. 1 shows that α-leakage is exactly Arimoto MI, and
therefore, several basic properties of α-leakage have been
shown including (i) non-negativity [43, Sec. II-A], (ii) quasi-
convexity3 in PY |X given PX [51, Chapter 3.5], and (iii) post-
processing inequality4 [52, Cor. 1]. We now explore proprieties
of maximal α-leakage and show that its properties include:
(i) quasi-convexity in the conditional distribution PY |X ; (ii)
data processing inequalities; (iii) sub-additivity (composition
property [28]) and additivity for memoryless mechanisms.
The following theorem results from the expression of max-
imal α-leakage in Thm. 2 as well as some known properties
of Sibson MI [43], [45], [48].
Theorem 3. For 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, maximal α-leakage
1. is quasi-convex in PY |X ;
2. is monotonically non-decreasing in α;
3. satisfies data processing inequalities: let random vari-
ables X,Y, Z form a Markov chain, i.e., X − Y − Z,
then
Lmaxα (X → Z) ≤ Lmaxα (X → Y )
Lmaxα (X → Z) ≤ Lmaxα (Y → Z).
(41a)
(41b)
4. satisfies
Lmaxα (X → Y ) ≥ 0 (42)
3For α ≥ 1 and PX , the Arimoto MI IAα(X;Y ) is the logarithm of a linear
combination of the p-norm (p = α) ‖PY |X(·|x)‖α. From [51, Chapter 3.5],
we know a log-convex function is quasi-convex such that IAα(X;Y ) is quasi-
convex in PY |X given PX .
4From the monotonicity of conditional Arimoto entropy [52, Cor. 1], one
can derive that for a Markov chain X − Y − Z, IAα(X;Z) ≤ IAα(X;Y ).
8with equality if and only if X is independent of Y , and
Lmaxα (X → Y ) ≤
{
log |X | α > 1
H(PX) α = 1
(43)
with equality if and only if X is a deterministic function
of Y .
A detailed proof is in Appendix E.
Remark 1. Note that:
• Since both MI and MaxL are convex in PY |X , Lmax1 (X →
Y ) and Lmax∞ (X → Y ) are convex in PY |X .
• From the monotonicity in Part 2, we can bound maximal
α-leakage from above by5
Lmaxα (X → Y ) ≤ LMaxL(X → Y ) = IS∞(X;Y ). (44)
• The data processing inequalities in (41a) and (41b) are
called post-processing inequality and linkage inequality,
respectively [53], [54]. It is worth noting that not all in-
formation leakage measures satisfy the linkage inequality
[25], [54]. Examples include α-leakage, maximal infor-
mation leakage [18], probability of correctly guessing,
and DP.
• From the monotonicity of maximal α-leakage and the
upper bound of MaxL in [28, Lemma 1], we know that
if |Y| < |X |, the upper bound in (43) can be tighter as
Lmaxα (X → Y ) ≤
{
log |Y| α > 1
min{H(PX), log |Y|} α = 1,
with equality for α > 1 if and only if Y is a deterministic
function of X .
From Thm. 2, we know that for α > 1, maximal α-
leakage is the supremum of Arimoto/Sibson MI over all
possible distributions on the support of original data, and
therefore, is a function of a conditional probability distribution.
The following theorem bounds the supremum from below
by a closed-form expression of the conditional probability
distribution.
Theorem 4 (Lower Bound). For 1 < α ≤ ∞, maximal α-
leakage is bounded from below by
Lmaxα (X → Y ) ≥
α
α− 1 log
∑
y∈Y
‖PY |X(y|·)‖α
|X | 1α , (45)
with equality if and only if for all x1, x2 ∈ X , there is∑
y
PY |X(y|x1)α
‖PY |X(y|·)‖α−1α
=
∑
y
PY |X(y|x2)α
‖PY |X(y|·)‖α−1α
. (46)
A detailed proof is in Appendix F.
When data may be revealed multiple times (e.g., entering
a password multiple times), it is essential to quantify how
mechanisms are designed with maximal α leakage compose in
terms of total leakage. Consider two released versions Y1 and
5For α = ∞, the IS∞(PX , PY |X) depends on the marginal distribution
PX only through the support of X .
Y2 of X . The following theorem limits maximal α-leakage to
an adversary who has access to both Y1 and Y2 simultaneously.
Theorem 5 (Sub-additivity/Composition). Given a Markov
chain Y1 −X − Y2, we have (α ∈ [1,∞])
Lmaxα (X → Y1, Y2) ≤
∑
i∈{1,2}
Lmaxα (X → Yi). (47)
A detailed proof is in Appendix G.
The following theorem shows the additivity of maximal α-
leakage for memoryless mechanisms.
Theorem 6 (Additivity for Memoryless Mechanisms). For
α ∈ [1,∞] and a finite integer n > 0, let Xn and Y n
be n-length input and output, respectively, of a memoryless
mechanism with no feedback, i.e.,
PY n|Xn =
n∏
i=1
PYi|Xi , (48)
where Xi and Yi represent the ith element of Xn and Y n,
respectively, such that
(1) for α > 1
Lmaxα (Xn → Y n) =
n∑
i=1
Lmaxα (Xi → Yi) (49)
(2) for α = 1
Lmax1 (Xn → Y n) ≤
n∑
i=1
Lmax1 (Xi → Yi) (50)
with equality if and only if entries of Xn are mutually
independent.
A detailed proof is in Appendix H.
V. PRIVACY-UTILITY TRADEOFF WITH A HARD
DISTORTION CONSTRAINT
In a privacy-guaranteed data publishing setting, a data
curator/provider uses a mapping called privacy mechanism to
generate distorted versions of original data for releases. The
privacy mechanism determines the fidelity of the released data.
With a higher fidelity, more utility is maintained, while less
privacy preserved. Therefore, a privacy-utility tradeoff (PUT)
problem arises in the design of the privacy mechanism.
We consider the two different data publishing scenarios
shown in Figs. 1a and 1b: the first where the entirety of
the dataset X is considered private, and the second where
the dataset consists of two parts S and X , where only S
is considered private. For the first case (Fig. 1a), we use
maximal α-leakage as the privacy measure, thereby limiting
the inference of any private information about the dataset
represented by the function U . For the second case (Fig. 1b),
we use α-leakage as the privacy measure, thereby limited the
inference only of the specific private information represented
by S.
We measure utility in terms of a hard distortion measure,
which constrains the privacy mechanism so that the distortion
between each pair of original and released data is bounded
with probability 1. Unlike average distortion measures, the
9hard distortion measure gives all data samples the same fidelity
guarantee (distortion bound), which is independent of the prob-
abilities of the samples. Therefore, the hard distortion measure
excludes the case that large distortions are applied to samples
with very small probabilities, which is possible under average
distortion constraints. The fidelity guarantee can lead to better
performance for applications for which low probability events
cannot be ignored or excluded easily (e.g., anomaly detection
from released datasets or high-fidelity empirical distribution
estimation for census applications) but is incompatible with
some privacy measures like DP and L-DP. Specifically, for
the original and released data X,Y and a distortion function
d(·, ·), the utility guarantee is modeled as the hard distortion
constraint d(X,Y ) ≤ D with probability 1, where D is the
maximal permitted distortion. In other words, if a privacy
mechanism PY |X satisfies the hard distortion constraint, given
input x, the output y of the privacy mechanism must lie in a
non-empty set BD(x) given by
BD(x) , {y : d(x, y) ≤ D}, (51)
i.e., for any x with PX(x) > 0, PY |X(y|x) = 0 if y /∈ BD(x).
Thus, a mathematical model of the PUT problem is given by
inf
PY |X∈PY |X
L(·)(·)(X → Y )
s.t., d(X,Y ) ≤ D,
(52a)
(52b)
where the set PY |X is the collection of stochastic matrices,
and the superscript and subscript of L depend on the privacy
measure under consideration (see Sec. III for notation).
Remark 2. Note that given any input x, the hard distortion
constraint in (52b) will force the conditional probabilities of
the outputs that are not in BD(x) to be zero. Thus, this utility
guarantee is incompatible with some privacy notions, which
require each input to be mapped to all outputs with some
positive probabilities; e.g., DP and any maximal f -leakage
with f(0) =∞.
A. PUTs for Entirely Sensitive Datasets
For the privacy-guaranteed publishing of an entirely sensi-
tive dataset shown in Fig. 1a, we use maximal α-leakage as the
privacy measure. From Section III-C, we know that maximal
α-leakage is a specific case of f -leakage and maximal f -
leakage (in Def. 7) for α = 1 and α > 1, respectively.
Hereby, we solve the PUT problems which minimize either
f -leakage or maximal f -leakage, subject to a hard distortion
constraint. By applying the relations between maximal α-
leakage and the f -divergence-based variants, we derive the
optimal PUTs and optimal privacy mechanisms for the PUT
problem with maximal α-leakage as the privacy measure. We
denote an optimal PUT as PUTHD,L(·)
(·)
, where HD and L(·)(·)
in the subscript indicate the hard distortion and the involved
privacy measure, respectively.
The following theorem characterizes the optimal tradeoff,
i.e., the minimal leakage for any given distortion bound D,
denoted as PUTHD,Lf (D), in (52) for the case that f -leakage
is used as the privacy measure.
Theorem 7. For any f -leakage Lf in (37) and a distortion
function d(·, ·) with BD(x) in (51), the optimal PUT in (52)
is given by
PUTHD,Lf (D)
= inf
PY |X :d(X,Y )≤D
Lf (X;Y ),
=f(0) + inf
QY
E
[
QY (BD(X))
(
f
(
1
QY (BD(X))
)−f(0))].
(53)
(54)
Moreover, letting Q?Y be the distribution achieving the infimum
in (54), an optimal mechanism P ?Y |X is given by
P ?Y |X(y|x) =
1
(
d(x, y) ≤ D)Q?Y (y)
Q?Y (BD(x))
. (55)
A detailed proof in Appendix I. Note that as a result of the
distribution dependence of the leakage measure Lf in (37),
the optimal tradeoff in (54) is an expected function of X .
The optimal mechanism P ∗Y |X(y|x) is, in fact, the normalized
probability of y when the conditional support of Y given X =
x is restricted to BD(x) (i.e., Y is restricted to taking values
in BD(x) for a given x).
In (52), making use of maximal f -divergence as the privacy
measure, the optimal PUT, denoted as PUTHD,Lmaxf (D), with
respect to the hard distortion constraint is given as the minimal
leakage for any given distortion bound D in the following
theorem.
Theorem 8. For any maximal f -leakage Lmaxf in (38), a
distortion function d(·, ·) and BD(x) in (51), the optimal PUT
in (52) is given by
PUTHD,Lmaxf (D) = infPY |X :d(X,Y )≤D
Lmaxf (X → Y ),
=q?f((q?)−1) + (1− q?)f(0),
(56)
(57)
with q? defined as
q? , sup
QY
inf
x
QY (BD(x)). (58)
Moreover, letting Q?Y be the distribution achieving the supre-
mum in (58), an optimal mechanism P ?Y |X is given by (55).
A detailed proof is in Appendix J. Observe that, in contrast
to the optimal tradeoff PUTHD,Lf for f -leakage in Thm. 7,
which depends on the probability distribution PX , the optimal
tradeoff PUTHD,Lmaxf for maximal f -leakage depends only on
the support of PX . This results from the fact that the maximal
f -leakage Lmaxf in (38) is the supremum over all possible
probability distribution on the support of PX , and therefore,
depends on PX only through the support.
The next corollary characterizes the optimal tradeoff
PUTHD,Lmaxα for maximal α-leakage. Recall that for α = 1,Lmax1 equals Lf with f(t) = t log t. For α > 1, from the one-
to-one relationship between Lmaxα and Lmaxfα in (40), we know
that finding PUTHD,Lmaxα is equivalent to finding the optimal
tradeoff PUTHD,Lmaxf in (56) for Lmaxf = Lmaxfα .
Corollary 1. For maximal α-leakage, the optimal PUT in (52)
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PUTHD,Lmaxα (D) = infPY |X :d(X,Y )≤D
Lmaxα (X → Y ), (59)
=
{
inf
QY
E
[
log 1QY (BD(X))
]
, α = 1 (60a)
− log q?, α > 1 (60b)
where q? is defined in (58). Moreover, an optimal mechanism
is given by (55), where for α = 1, Q?Y achieves the infimum
in (60a); and for α > 1, Q?Y achieves the supremum in (58).
Remark 3. The optimal PUTs in (54) and (57) simplify to
finding an output distribution Q∗Y that can be viewed as a
“target” distribution, i.e., the optimal mechanism aims to
produce this distribution as closely as possible, subject to the
utility constraint. In particular, given an input, the optimal
mechanism in (55) distributes the outputs according to Q∗Y
while conditioning the output to be within a ball of radius
D around the input. The optimization in (58) ensures that
all inputs are uniformly masked while (54) provides average
guarantees.
Moreover, for any arbitrarily chosen maximal f -leakage,
the optimal PUT in (57) leads to the same target distribu-
tion Q∗Y given by (58). Therefore, the corresponding optimal
mechanism in (55) is independent of the choice of maximal
f -leakage. As a special case of (57), the optimal tradeoff in
(60b), for maximal α-leakage with α > 1, is achieved by the
optimal mechanism (in (55)) that is no longer depending on α.
And the optimal tradeoff (in (60b)) itself is also independent
of the value of α > 1.
B. PUTs for Datasets Containing Non-Sensitive Data
For datasets containing both sensitive and non-sensitive
data, indicated by S and X , respectively, as shown in Fig
1b, the purpose of privacy protection is to limit information
leakage of sensitive data while releasing non-sensitive data.
We use α-leakage from S to Y as the privacy measure, where
Y is the released version of X . Therefore, with PY |S,X in the
place of PY |X in (52), we obtain the optimal PUT as
PUTHD,Lα(D) = inf
PY |S,X :d(X,Y )≤D
Lα(S;Y ). (61)
The following theorem bounds PUTHD,Lα from below. Note
that the BD in the following is the distortion ball defined in
(51).
Theorem 9. The minimal leakage PUTHD,Lα (1 ≤ α ≤ ∞)
in (61) is bounded from below by
PUTHD,Lα(D) ≥
∑
s,x
P (s, x) log
(
max
y∈BD(x)
∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)
)−1
, α=1
log
∑
s,x
P (s)P (s,x)
max
s
PS(s)
(
max
y∈BD(x)
∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)
)−1
, α=∞
α
α−1 log
∑
s,x
P (s)αP (x|s)
‖PS‖α
(
max
y∈BD(x)
∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)α
) 1−α
α
, else
where the set SD(y) of s for each y is defined as
SD(y) , {s : ∃x, PS,X(s, x) > 0, d(x, y) ≤ D}. (62)
The lower bound is tight if there exists an privacy mechanism
PY |S,X ∈ PY |S,X(D) such that
(i) given (s, x), for any y with P (y|s, x) > 0,∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′) = max
y′∈BD(s,x)
∑
s′∈SD(y′)
P (s′); (63)
(ii) given any y with PY (y) > 0, for any s ∈ SD(y),∑
x:d(x,y)≤D
P (y|s, x)P (x|s)= PY (y)∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)
, (64)
where PY is the marginal distribution of Y from the
privacy mechanism PY |S,X and PS,X .
The proof details are in Appendix K.
Note that by using maximal α-leakage as the privacy mea-
sure, the setting for publishing datasets consisting of sensitive
and non-sensitive data can be generalized to restrict leakages
about all functions of the sensitive data. This will be addressed
in future work.
VI. APPLICATIONS: PUTS FOR HARD AND AVERAGE
DISTORTION CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we first illustrate the results of Sec. V
and present the optimal PUTs for two distinct hard distortion
functions. Our first choice for hard distortion, restricted to
binary datasets, is the absolute distance between the types
(i.e., empirical distributions) of the original and revealed
(binary) datasets. This choice is motivated by the observation
that, for any dataset, the type is a sufficient statistic for any
function of the dataset that is unaffected by permutation—for
example, mean, variance, correlation between two features.
Thus, constraining the distortion between the released type
and the original type, one can guarantee the utility of the
released dataset for a variety of statistical applications. In
Example 1 below, we derive the optimal mechanism under this
distortion measure for binary datasets. Our second choice for
hard distortion is the Hamming distance between the original
and released datasets for discrete alphabets. This choice is
motivated by the fact that a hard Hamming distortion is more
relevant when the order of the entries in the dataset cannot
be changed. In Example 2 below, we derive the optimal
mechanism under this distortion for a dataset sampled from
an arbitrary discrete alphabet. Note that, as a consequence of
Corollary 1, for these examples the optimal PUT and privacy
mechanism are the same for all values of α > 1.
In contrast to hard distortion measures, in Example 3, we
study the PUTs that result from using average Hamming
distortion as the utility measure and maximal α-leakage as
the privacy measure. Due to lack of closed-form solutions, we
use numerical results to highlight the dependence of both the
optimal PUTs and the privacy mechanisms on α.
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A. Example 1: Binary Datasets with Hard Distortion on Types
Let Xn be a random dataset with n entries and Y n be
the corresponding released dataset generated by a privacy
mechanism PY n|Xn . Entries of both Xn and Y n are from
the same alphabet X . Adopting the notation of [55, Chapter
11], let Pxn and Pyn indicate the types of input dataset xn
and output dataset yn, respectively. We define the distortion
function as the distance between types, given by
dT(x
n, yn) = max
x∈X
|Pxn(x)− Pyn(x)|, (65)
and therefore, obtain PUTHD,Lmaxα as in (59) but with datasets
Xn, Y n in place of single letters X,Y . Since types of n-length
sequences take on only values that are multiples of 1n , this
distortion function dT takes on values of the form mn , where
m ∈ [0, n].
We concentrate on binary datasets, i.e., X = {0, 1}. Note
that for binary datasets, we can simply write dT(xn, yn) =
|Pxn(1)−Pyn(1)|. For a n-length binary dataset, the number
of types is n+1. Therefore, all input and output datasets can
be categorized into n+ 1 type classes defined as
T (i) , {xn : nPxn(1) = i}. (66)
Theorem 10. For binary datasets and the distortion function
in (65), given integers n,m where 0 ≤ m ≤ n, the optimal
tradeoff for α > 1 is
PUTHD,Lmaxα
(m
n
)
= min
PY n|Xn :
dT(X
n,Y n)≤mn
Lmaxα (Xn → Y n)
= log
⌈
n+1
2m+1
⌉
.
(67)
(68)
An optimal privacy mechanism maps all input datasets in a
type class to a unique output dataset which is feasible and
belongs to a type class in the set T ? given by
T ? ,
{
T (j) : j=l+(2m+1)k, k ∈ [0,d n+12m+1e−1]
}
, (69)
where l = m if d n+12m+1e − n+12m+1 ≤ m2m+1 , and otherwise,
l = n−
(
d n+12m+1e − 1
)
(2m+ 1).
A detailed proof is in Appendix L. Note that for any xn in
the type class T (i), the corresponding output yn generated
by the optimal mechanism P ∗Y n|Xn is unique and belongs
to the unique type class in T ? ∩ {T (j) : |i − j| ≤ m}.
For example, if (n,m) = (9, 2), then from Thm. 10, we
have PUTHD,Lmaxα (
2
9 ) = 1 bit and T ? = {T (2), T (7)}. Fig. 5
shows the optimal mechanism, which maps all input datasets
in {T (i) : i ∈ [0, 4]} (resp. {T (i) : i ∈ [5, 9]}) to a unique
output dataset in T (2) (resp. T (7)) with probability 1.
B. Example 2: Hard Hamming Distortion on Datasets
In the example, we consider hard Hamming distortion on
datasets with entries from general finite alphabets. Formally,
for datasets xn, yn ∈ Xn, we define the Hamming distortion
function as
dH(x
n, yn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1(xi 6= yi). (70)
0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0
1
1
Fig. 5: An optimal mechanism PUTHD,Lmaxα
(
m
n
)
for α > 1
with (n,m) = (9, 2), where rows and columns are types
of Xn and Y n, respectively. Note that the hard distortion
forces conditional probabilities of outputs outside the feasible
ball of given input to be zero. We highlight the conditional
probabilities of feasible outputs in green, and give their values
in the optimal mechanism.
Therefore, we obtain PUTHD,Lmaxα as in (59) but with datasets
Xn, Y n in place of single letters X,Y .
Theorem 11. For datasets from a finite alphabet X and
Hamming distortion function, for any integers n,m where
0 ≤ m ≤ n, the optimal tradeoff for α > 1 is
PUTHD,Lmaxα
(m
n
)
= min
PY n|Xn :
dH(x
n,yn)≤mn
Lmaxα (Xn → Y n)
= log
|X |n∑m
i=0
(
n
i
)
(|X | − 1)i .
(71)
(72)
An optimal privacy mechanism maps each input xn ∈ Xn
uniformly to every feasible output, i.e., for all xn, yn where
dH(x
n, yn) ≤ mn , PY n|Xn(yn|xn) = 1∑m
i=0 (
n
i)(|X |−1)i
.
Note that for any pair of xn and yn, the optimal mechanism
P ∗Y n|Xn(y
n|xn) is the average probability of yn when the
support of Y n is restricted to BD(xn), i.e., Y n takes values
from {yn : dH(xn, yn) ≤ mn }. The key observation to reach
the conclusion in Thm. 11 is that every output dataset is in the
same number of feasible balls, such that a uniform distribution
over the output space leads to equal probability for the feasible
ball of each input dataset. The proof details are in Appendix
M. Fig. 6 illustrates the optimal mechanism in Thm. 11 for
X = {0, 1, 2} and (n,m) = (2, 1).
Note that permuting items of a dataset does not change the
type but will lead to a non-zero Hamming distortion. The
distortion on types in (65) can be viewed as a relaxation of
the Hamming distortion, in the sense that the set of feasible
privacy mechanisms in (71) belongs to that in (67), i.e.,{
PY n|Xn : dH(xn, yn) ≤ m
n
}
⊂
{
PY n|Xn : dT(xn, yn) ≤ m
n
}
.
Therefore, for non-binary alphabets, the result in Thm. 11
limits the minimal leakage in (67).
C. Example 3: Average Hamming Distortion on Binary Al-
phabet
We consider a PUT setting with maximal α-leakage as
the privacy measure and average Hamming distortion as the
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(0,0) (0,1) (0,2) (1,0) (1,1) (1,2) (2,0) (2,1) (2,2)
(0,0) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(0,1) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(0,2) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(1,0) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(1,1) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(1,2) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(2,0) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(2,1) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(2,2) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Fig. 6: An optimal mechanism of (71) for α > 1 with
(n,m) = (2, 1) and X = {0, 1, 2} where rows and columns
are xn and yn, respectively. Note that we color the conditional
probabilities of feasible outputs (respect to the hard Hamming
distortion) and their values are the same as 0.2 in the optimal
mechanism.
distortion constraint. Such an average utility constraint can be
relevant to data publishing settings where preserving statistics
of the dataset is desired. This example also illustrates that, in
contrast to the hard distortion constraint, the optimal mecha-
nism may depend on α.
Consider the following PUT problem that minimizes max-
imal α-leakage subject to the average Hamming distortion
constraint:
min
PY |X
Lmaxα (X → Y )
s.t.,
∑
x,y∈X
PX,Y (x, y)1 (y 6= x) ≤ D
(73a)
(73b)
where 0 < D < 1−maxx PX(x) is the maximum permitted
average Hamming distortion. We focus on the binary case:
let X,Y ∈ {0, 1} where X follow the Bernoulli distribution
Bern(p) (0 < p < 1), i.e., PX(1) = p. We represent the
privacy mechanism PY |X via the two crossover probabilities
PY |X(1|0) = ρ1 and PY |X(0|1) = ρ2. By solving the
supremum in the expression of maximal α-leakage, for α > 1,
the optimization in (73) can be written as
min
ρ1,ρ2
1
α− 1 log
(
(1− ρ1)α(1− ρ2)α − (ρ1ρ2)α
)
+ log
(
(
(1− ρ1)α − ρα2
) 1
1−α +
(
(1− ρ2)α − ρα1
) 1
1−α
)
(74a)
s.t. (1− p)ρ1 + pρ2 ≤ D. (74b)
Fig. 7 shows the optimal values and mechanisms in (74) for
p = 0.4 and D = 0.2 or D = 0.1. From the plots, we can see
that for α = 1.001, the optimal mechanism P ∗Y |X (represented
by ρ∗1 and ρ
∗
2) is slightly different from that of mutual
information [55, Figure 10.3] due to the fact that as α tends to
1, the limit of maximal α-leakage is Shannon channel capacity
instead of mutual information, i.e., limα→1 Lmaxα (X → Y ) =
limα→1 supPX˜ I
A
α(X˜;Y ) = supPX˜ I(X˜;Y ). We also observe
that as α grows, the optimal crossover probabilities ρ∗1 and ρ
∗
2
gradually approach to 0 and Dp , respectively. Therefore, for
the PUT in (74), maximal α-leakage with different values of
1 < α < ∞ leads to various optimal privacy mechanisms,
which can differ from that for either α = 1 or α =∞.
It is not difficult to check that the optimal privacy
mechanisms (in Fig. 7b) for different values of α give
the same probability of correctly guessing, defined as∑
y PY (y)maxx PY |X(y|x) [27], which equals to 1 − D in
this example. Probability of correctly guessing is, in fact,
the average accuracy of estimating the value of original data
X from Y when the maximal posterior (MAP) estimator is
used. Therefore, if the original data X is released against an
adversary who is only interested in the most likely value of
X , all values of α will lead to the same privacy guarantee in
the sense that the optimal mechanisms give the same average
accuracy of estimation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Via α-loss (1 ≤ α ≤ ∞), we have defined two tunable mea-
sures of information leakage: α-leakage for a specific function
of original data, and maximal α-leakage for any arbitrary
function of original data, and proven that: (i) α-leakage equals
to Arimoto mutual information for 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞; (ii) for α > 1,
maximal α-leakage equals to Arimoto channel capacity; and
for α = 1 and α =∞ it simplifies to mutual information and
maximal leakage, respectively. From properties of Arimoto
mutual information, α-leakage is known to be quasi-convex
in the conditional distribution and satisfy the post-processing
inequality. For maximal α-leakage, we have proven that it is
quasi-convex in the conditional distribution, and satisfies data
processing inequalities as well as a composition property.
In the context of privacy-guaranteed data publishing, we
have explored PUT problems for the proposed tunable leakage
measures and hard distortion utility constraints. This utility
constraint has the advantage that it allows the data cura-
tor/provider to make specific, deterministic guarantees on the
quality of the released dataset. For maximal α-leakage, we
have shown that: (i) for all α > 1, we obtain the same
optimal privacy mechanism and optimal PUT, both of which
are independent of the distribution of the original data; (ii)
for α = 1, the optimal mechanism differs and depends on
the distribution of the original data. In other words, for this
hard distortion measure, maximal α-leakage behaves as either
mutual information or maximal leakage. We have also demon-
strated that this extremal behavior may not hold when the
hard distortion constraint is replaced by an average distortion
constraint (e.g., average Hamming distortion) and the source
alphabet is binary. Future directions include studying PUT
problems with average distortion constraints for non-binary
alphabets to further explore the impact of α on the design of
privacy mechanisms.
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Fig. 7: Numerical results for the privacy-utility tradeoff in (74) with p = 0.4 and D ∈ {0.2, 0.1}. Figure 7a plots the minimal
values of maximal α-leakage as a function of α (circles indicate α = 1 and stars are for 1.001 ≤ α ≤ 4). Figure 7b illustrates
the behavior of the crossover probabilities ρ∗1 and ρ
∗
2 for the optimal privacy mechanisms as a function of α.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
For 1 < α < ∞, the minimal expected value of the α-loss
in Definition 3 can be expressed as
min
PXˆ|Y
E
[
`α(X,Y, PXˆ|Y )
]
=min
PXˆ|Y
α
α− 1
(
1−
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y)PXˆ|Y (x|y)
α−1
α
)
(75)
=
α
α− 1
(
1− max
PXˆ|Y
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y)PXˆ|Y (x|y)
α−1
α
)
(76)
=
α
α− 1
(
1−
∑
y
P (y) max
PXˆ|Y=y
∑
x
P (x|y)PXˆ|Y (x|y)
α−1
α
)
.(77)
For each y with PY (y) > 0, the maximization in (77) can be
explicitly written as
max
PXˆ|Y=y
∑
x∈X
PX|Y (x|y)PXˆ|Y (x|y)
α−1
α
s.t.
∑
x∈X
PXˆ|Y (x|y) = 1
PXˆ|Y (x|y) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X .
(78a)
(78b)
(78c)
For 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, the exponent α−1α ≥ 0 such that the problem
in (78) is a convex program. Therefore, by using Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [51, Chapter 5.5.3], we obtain
the optimal value of (78) as
max
PXˆ|Y=y
∑
x
PX|Y (x|y)PXˆ|Y (x|y)
α−1
α = ‖PX|Y (·|y)‖α (79)
with the optimal solution P ?
Xˆ|Y as
P ?
Xˆ|Y (x|y) =
PX|Y (x|y)α∑
x∈X PX|Y (x|y)α
for all x ∈ X . (80)
For α = 1, the optimal solution is P ?
Xˆ|Y = PX|Y . For α =∞,
we have
lim
α→∞P
?
Xˆ|Y (x|y) = limα→∞
(
PX|Y (x|y)
maxx PX|Y (x|y)
)α
∑
x∈X
(
PX|Y (x|y)
maxx PX|Y (x|y)
)α (81)
=
{
1
k(y) , x = argmaxx PX|Y (x|y)
0, otherwise,
(82)
where the integer k(y) indicates the cardinality of the set {x :
x = argmaxx PX|Y (x|y)}.
Applying the optimal solution P ?
Xˆ|Y to (77), we have
min
PXˆ|Y
E
[
`α(X,Y, PXˆ|Y )
]
=

α
α−1
(
1−∑
y
‖PX,Y (Xy)‖α
)
, α > 1∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y) log
1
PX|Y (x|y) , α = 1
,
=
{
α
α−1
(
1− exp ( 1−αα HAα (X|Y ))) , α > 1
H(X|Y ), α = 1 .
(83)
(84)
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The expression (27) can be explicitly written as
Lα(X → Y )
= lim
α′→α
α′
α′ − 1 log

max
PXˆ|Y
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y)PXˆ|Y (x|y)
α′−1
α′
max
PXˆ
∑
x
PX(x)PXˆ(x)
α′−1
α′
 .(85)
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To simplify the expression in (85), we need to solve the two
maximizations in the logarithm. From (29), we know that to
solve the maximization in the numerator equals to find the
minimal expected α-loss. Making use of the result in Lemma
1, we have that for α′ ∈ (1,∞),
max
PXˆ|Y
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x,y)PXˆ|Y (x|y)
α′−1
α′ =exp
(
1−α′
α′
HAα′(X|Y )
)
.(86)
Similarly, by applying KKT conditions to the maximization in
the denominator, we have that for α′ ∈ (1,∞)
max
PXˆ
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PXˆ(x)
α′−1
α′ = exp
(
1− α′
α′
Hα′(X)
)
. (87)
Therefore, we have for α′ ∈ (1,∞)
Lα(X → Y )
=
α′
α′ − 1 log exp
(
1− α′
α′
(
HAα′(X|Y )−Hα′(X)
))
=IAα′(X;Y ).
(88)
(89)
From the continuous extensions of Arimoto MI for α = 1
and ∞, respectively, we have that for 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, α-leakage
equals to Arimoto MI.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
From Thm. 1, we have for 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞,
Lmaxα (X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y
IAα(U ;Y ). (90)
If α = 1, we have
Lmax1 (X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y
I(U ;Y ) ≤ I(X;Y ) (91)
where the inequality is from data processing inequalities of MI
[55, Thm 2.8.1]. We then prove that the upper bound I(X;Y )
in (91) can be achieved. Let U be a function of X satisfying
H(X|U) = 0. From the condition H(X|U) = 0 and the
Markov chain U −X − Y , we have
H(X,Y |U) =H(X|U) +H(Y |X,U) = 0 +H(Y |X),
H(X,Y |U) =H(Y |U) +H(X|Y, U) = H(Y |U) + 0,
i.e., H(Y |X) = H(Y |U). Therefore, for a function U sat-
isfying H(X|U) = 0, there is L1(U → Y ) = I(U ;Y ) =
I(X;Y ).
If α =∞, we have
Lmax∞ (X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y
log
∑
y
PY (y)max
u
PU |Y (u|y)
max
u
PU (u)
, (92)
which is exactly the expression of MaxL, and therefore, we
have that for α = ∞, the maximal α-leakage equals to the
Sibson MI of order ∞ [28, Thm. 1], i.e.,
Lmax∞ (X → Y ) = log
∑
y
max
x
PY |X(y|x). (93)
For α ∈ (1,∞), we provide an upper bound for Lmaxα (X →
Y ), and then, give an achievable scheme as follows.
Upper Bound: We have an upper bound of Lmaxα (X → Y ) as
Lmaxα (X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y
IAα(U ;Y ) (94)
= sup
PY,X˜|U˜ :PX˜=PX
PY |X˜,U˜=PY |X
sup
PU˜
IAα(U˜ ;Y ) (95)
≤ sup
PY,X˜|U˜ :PX˜|U˜ (·|u)PX
PY |X˜,U˜=PY |X
sup
PU˜
IAα(U˜ ;Y ) (96)
= sup
PY,X˜|U˜ :PX˜|U˜ (·|u)PX
PY |X˜,U˜=PY |X
sup
PU˜
ISα(U˜ ;Y ) (97)
= sup
PX˜PX
ISα(X˜;Y ) (98)
= sup
PX˜PX
IAα(X˜;Y ) (99)
where PX˜  PX indicate that the support of PX˜ is a subset
of the support of PX6. In (95), U˜ − X˜ − Y forms a Markov
chain and the probability distribution of X˜ is constrained to
be PX . The upper bound in (96) results from allowing X˜ to
be distributed arbitrarily over the support of X . The equations
in (97) and (99) result from that Arimoto MI and Sibson MI
of order α > 0 have the same supremum [43, Thm. 5], which
can be proved from the expressions of Arimoto and Sibson
MIs as follows:
sup
PU˜
IAα(U˜ ;Y )
=sup
PU˜
α
α− 1 log
∑
y
(∑
u
PU˜,Y (u, y)
α
) 1
α
(∑
u
PU˜ (u)
α
) 1
α
(100)
=sup
PU˜
α
α− 1 log
∑
y
(∑
u
PU˜ (u)
α∑
u
PU˜ (u)
α
PY |U˜ (y|u)α
) 1
α
(101)
=sup
PU˜′
α
α− 1 log
∑
y
(∑
u
PU˜ ′(u)PY |U˜ (y|u)α
) 1
α
(102)
=sup
PU˜′
IAα(U˜
′;Y ) (103)
where PU˜ and PU˜ ′ are probability distributions over the same
support and for each u, PU˜ ′(u) =
PU˜ (u)
α∑
u
PU˜ (u)
α . From the data
processing inequalities of Sibson MI for the Markov chain
U˜−X˜−Y , we have that ISα(U˜ ;Y ) ≤ ISα(X˜;Y ) with equality
if and only if U˜ = X˜ [43, Thm. 3]. Therefore, in (97)
supPU˜ I
S
α(U˜ ;Y ) = I
S
α(X˜;Y ), and then, by replacing U˜ with
X˜ we have (98).
Lower bound: We bound (90) from below by considering a
random variable U such that U −X − Y is a Markov chain
and H(X|U) = 0. Specifically, let the alphabet U consist of
Ux, a collection of U mapped to a x ∈ X , i.e., U =
⋃
x∈X Ux
6Note that any set is also the subset of itself, such that the support of X˜
can be the same as that of X
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with U = u ∈ Ux if and only if X = x. Therefore, for the
specific variable U , we have
PY |U (y|u) =
{
PY |X(y|x) for all u ∈ Ux
0 otherwise.
(104)
Construct a probability distribution PX˜ over X from PU as
PX˜(x) =
∑
u∈Ux PU (u)
α∑
x∈X
∑
u∈Ux PU (u)
α
for all x ∈ X . (105)
Thus,
IAα(U ;Y )
=
α
α− 1 log
∑
y∈Y
( ∑
x∈X
∑
u∈Ux
PY |U (y|u)αPU (u)α
) 1
α
( ∑
x∈X
∑
u∈Ux
PU (u)α
) 1
α
(106)
=
α
α− 1 log
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
PY |X(y|x)α
∑
u∈Ux
PU (u)
α∑
x∈X
∑
u∈Ux
PU (u)α

1
α
(107)
=
α
α− 1 log
∑
y∈Y
(∑
x∈X
PY |X(y|x)αPX˜(x)
) 1
α
(108)
=ISα(X˜;Y ). (109)
Therefore,
Lmaxα (X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y
IAα(U ;Y )
≥ sup
U :U−X−Y,H(X|U)=0
IAα(U ;Y )
= sup
PX˜PX
ISα(X˜;Y ),
(110)
(111)
(112)
where the last equality follows because, for any PX˜  PX ,
there exists a distribution PU (u) for u ∈ U such that (105)
holds; therefore, the supremum over these U in (104) is
equivalent to the supremum of PX˜ . Therefore, combining (98)
and (112), we obtain (31a).
APPENDIX D: PROOF FOR LEMMA 2
Define the convex function
fα(t) =
1
α− 1(t
α − 1), (113)
then for the two distributions P and Q over the support Y ,
we have a f -divergence Hα(P‖Q), which is the Hellinger
divergence of order α [50], given by
Hα(P‖Q) = 1
α− 1
(∑
Y
P (y)αQ(y)1−α − 1
)
. (114)
Therefore, the Re´nyi divergence can be written in terms of the
Hellinger divergence as
Dα(P‖Q) = 1
α− 1 log(1 + (α− 1)Hα(P‖Q)). (115)
Thus, since z 7→ 1α−1 log(1 + (α − 1)z) is monotonically
increasing in z for α > 1, we can write maximal α-leakage
as
Lmaxα (X → Y )
=sup
PX
inf
QY
Dα(PX,Y ‖PX ×QY ) (116)
=
1
α− 1 log
(
1 + (α− 1) sup
PX
inf
QY
Hα(X → Y )
)
(117)
=
1
α− 1 log
(
1 + (α− 1)LHα(X → Y )
)
. (118)
That is, for α > 1 maximal α-leakage is a monotonic function
of the Hellinger divergence-based measure.
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The proof of part 1: We know that for α ≥ 1, ISα(X;Y )
is quasi-convex PY |X for given PX [55, Thm. 2.7.4], [48,
Thm. 10]. In addition, the supremum of a set of quasi-convex
functions is also quasi-convex, i.e., if the function f(a, b) is
quasi-convex in b for any given a, the supremum supa f(a, b)
is also quasi-convex in b [51]. Therefore, maximal α-leakage
in (31) is quasi-convex PY |X .
The proof of part 2: Let β > α ≥ 1, and P ?Xα =
arg supPX I
S
α(PX , PY |X) for given PY |X , such that
Lmaxα (X → Y )= ISα(P ?Xα, PY |X) (119)
≤ ISβ(P ?Xα, PY |X) (120)
≤ sup
PX
ISβ(PX , PY |X) (121)
= Lmaxβ (X → Y ) (122)
where (120) results from that ISα is non-decreasing in α for
α > 0 [48, Thm. 4], and the equality in (121) holds if and
only if P ?Xα = arg supPX Iβ(PX , PY |X).
The proof of part 3: Let random variables X , Y and Z form
the Markov chain X − Y −Z. Making use of that Sibson MI
of order α > 1 satisfies data processing inequalities [43, Thm.
3], i.e.,
ISα(X;Z) ≤ ISα(X;Y ) (123)
ISα(X;Z) ≤ ISα(Y ;Z), (124)
we prove that maximal α-leakage satisfies data processing
inequalities as follows.
We first prove (41a). Let P ?X = arg supPX I
S
α(PX , PZ|X). For
the Markov chain X − Y − Z, we have
Lmaxα (X → Z)= ISα(P ?X , PZ|X) (125)
≤ ISα(P ?X , PY |X) (126)
≤ sup
PX
ISα(PX , PY |X) (127)
= Lmaxα (X → Y ) (128)
where the inequality in (126) results from (123). Similarly, the
inequality in (41b) can be proved directly from (124).
The proof of part 4: For α = 1, we have
Lmax1 (X → Y ) = I(X;Y ) ≥ 0, (129)
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with equality if and only if X is independent of Y [55]. For
1 < α ≤ ∞, referring to (6) and (31a) we have
Lmaxα (X → Y )
=sup
PX
α
α− 1 log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)α
) 1
α
(130)
≥sup
PX
α
α− 1 log
∑
y
(∑
x
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)
)α
α
(131)
=sup
PX
α
α− 1 log 1 = 0, (132)
where (131) results from applying Jensens inequality to the
convex function f : t → tα (t ≥ 0), such that the equality
holds if and only if given any y ∈ Y , PY |X(y|x) are the same
for all x ∈ X , such that
PY |X(y|x) = PY (y) x ∈ X , y ∈ Y (133)
which means X and Y are independent, i.e., PY |X is a rank-1
row stochastic matrix.
For α = 1, from (31b) we know Lmax1 (X → Y ) = I(X;Y ).
Therefore,
Lmax1 (X → Y )−H(X)
=
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
P (x, y) log
P (y|x)
P (y)
−
∑
x∈X
P (x) log
1
P (x)
(134)
=
∑
x,y
P (x, y) log
P (y|x)
P (y)
−
∑
x,y
P (x, y) log
1
P (x)
(135)
=
∑
x,y
P (x, y) logP (x|y) ≤ 0, (136)
with equality if and only if for all x, y ∈ X×Y , the conditional
probability PX|Y (x|y) is either 1 or 0. That is, Lmax1 (X →
Y ) ≤ H(X) with equality if and only if X is a deterministic
function of Y . For 1 < α ≤ ∞, from the monotonicity of
maximal α-leakage in α and (31a), we have
Lmaxα (X → Y ) ≤ Lmax∞ (X → Y )
= log
∑
y∈Y
max
x
PY |X(y|x)
≤ log
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
PY |X(y|x) = log |X |.
(137)
(138)
(139)
where the equality in (139) holds if and only if for every
y ∈ Y , ∑X P (y|x) = maxx P (y|x), i.e., X is a deterministic
function of Y . To prove that for α ∈ (1,∞), the upper bound
in (139) is achievable, we construct a mapping PX⇐Y such
that X is a deterministic function of Y . That is, for every
y ∈ Y , there exists a unique xy ∈ X such that P (xy|y) = 1.
Therefore, we have xy = argx PX⇐Y (y|x) > 0. For α ∈
(1,∞), from (6) and (31b) we have
Lmaxα (PX⇐Y )
=sup
PX
α
α− 1 log
∑
y∈Y
(
P
1
α
X (xy)PX⇐Y (y|xy)
)
(140)
=sup
PX
α
α− 1 log
∑
x∈X
P
1
α
X (x); (141)
in addition, since the function maximized in (141) is sym-
metric and concave in PX , it is Schur-concave in PX , and
therefore, the optimal distribution of X achieving the supreme
in (141) is uniform. Thus,
Lmaxα (PX⇐Y ) = log |X |, 1 < α ≤ ∞. (142)
Therefore, maximal α-leakage achieves its maximal value
log |X | and H(PX) for α > 1 and α = 1, respectively, if
and only if X is a deterministic function of Y .
APPENDIX F: PROOF FOR THEOREM 4
To prove Thm. 4, we define a divergence function kα for
α > 1 and provide a lower bound for its sum in the following
definition and lemma, respectively.
Definition 8. Given two discrete distributions PY and QY
over the support Y , a divergence function kα for α > 1 is
defined as
kα(PY ‖QY ) ,
∑
y
QY (y)
(
PY (y)
QY (y)
)α
. (143)
Proposition 1. The function kα(PY ‖QY ) in (143) is jointly
convex in (PY , QY ), and kα(PY ‖QY ) ≥ 1 with equality if
and only if PY = QY .
Proof. For α ≥ 1, the function f(t) = tα is convex in t ≥ 0,
such that the perspective of f(t), defined as g(t, a) = af(t/a)
(a > 0), is convex in (t, a) [51, Chapter. 3.2.6]. Let t = PY (y)
and a = QY (y) > 0 such that the perspective function can be
written as
g(PY (y), QY (y)) = QY (y)
(
PY (y)
QY (y)
)α
, (144)
which is therefore convex in (PY (y), QY (y)). For QY (y) = 0,
the function g(PY (y), QY (y)) is zero, which is also convex
in (PY (y), QY (y)). Thus, the function kα(PY ‖QY ) in (143)
is a sum of convex functions, and therefore, it is convex in
(PY (y), QY (y)).
Let t = PY (y)QY (y) . From the convexity of f(t) = t
α in t ≥ 0 and
Jensens inequality [51, Chapter. 3.1.8], we have that
kα(PY ‖QY ) ,
∑
y
QY (y)
(
PY (y)
QY (y)
)α
≥
∑
y
(∑
y
QY (y)
PY (y)
QY (y)
)α
= 1.
(145)
(146)
Lemma 3. Let K be a positive integer with K < ∞. Given
a group of distributions {Pk : k ∈ [1,K]} and an arbitrary
distribution P on a discrete set Y , there is
K∑
k=1
kα(Pk‖P ) ≥
K∑
k=1
kα(Pk‖Pc)
=
∑
y
(
K∑
k=1
Pk(y)
α
) 1
α
α ,
(147)
(148)
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with equality if and only if P = Pc, where Pc is given by
Pc(y) =
1
Z
(
K∑
k=1
Pk(y)
α
) 1
α
, α ∈ [1,∞] (149)
where Z is the constant as
Z =
∑
y
(
K∑
k=1
Pk(y)
α
) 1
α
, (150)
which guarantees that Pc is a distribution.
Proof. From the definition kα in (143), we have
K∑
k=1
kα(Pk‖P )−
K∑
k=1
kα(Pk‖Pc)
=
K∑
k=1
∑
y
Pk(y)
α
(
P (y)1−α − Pc(y)1−α
)
(151)
=
∑
y
(
K∑
k=1
Pk(y)
α
)(
P (y)1−α − Pc(y)1−α
)
(152)
=
∑
y
ZαPc(y)
α
(
P (y)1−α − Pc(y)1−α
)
(153)
=Zα
∑
y
(
Pc(y)
αP (y)1−α − Pc(y)
)
(154)
=Zα(kα(Pc‖P )− 1) ≥ 0 (155)
with equality if and only if P = Pc. In addition, making use
of the expression of Pc and Z in (149) and (150), respectively,
we have
K∑
k=1
kα(Pk‖Pc)
=
K∑
k=1
∑
y
Pc(y)
(
Pk(y)
Pc(y)
)α
(156)
=
K∑
k=1
∑
y
Zα−1
(
K∑
k′=1
Pk′(y)
α
) 1
α
Pk(y)
α
K∑
k′=1
Pk′(y)α
(157)
=Zα−1
∑
y
(
K∑
k′=1
Pk′(y)
α
) 1
α ∑K
k=1 Pk(y)
α∑K
k′=1 Pk′(y)
α
(158)
=
∑
y
(
K∑
k=1
Pk(y)
α
) 1
α
α . (159)
Making use of the results in Lemma 3, we prove Thm. 4
as follows.
Proof. From Thm. 2, we have that for α > 1
Lmaxα (X → Y )
=sup
PX˜
ISα(X˜, Y ) = sup
PX˜
inf
QY
Dα(PX˜PY |X‖PX˜QY ) (160)
=sup
PX˜
inf
QY
1
α− 1 log
∑
x
PX˜(x)kα(PY |X=x‖QY ). (161)
For α > 1, the function f : t → 1α−1 log t is increasing in
t ≥ 0. Therefore, we simplify the optimization in (161) as
sup
PX˜
inf
QY
∑
x
PX˜(x)kα(PY |X=x‖QY ) (162)
and provide a lower bound of (162) as follows. Since the
divergence function kα is joint convex in the pair of dis-
tributions, the objective function in (162) is joint convex
in (PY |X , QY ) for fixed PX˜ , and linear in PX˜ for fixed
(PY |X , QY ). Therefore, the max-min equals to the min-max
as followed:
sup
PX˜
inf
QY
∑
x
PX˜(x)kα(PY |X=x‖QY )
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∑
x
PX˜(x)kα(PY |X=x‖QY ) (163)
=inf
QY
max
x
kα(PY |X=x‖QY ) (164)
≥inf
QY
∑
x kα(PY |X=x‖QY )
|X | (165)
≥
∑
x kα(PY |X=x‖Pc)
|X | (166)
=
1
|X |
(∑
y
‖PY |X(y|·)‖α
)α
, (167)
where the inequality in (166) is directly from (147) in
Lemma 3 with equality if and only if
QY (y) = Pc(y) =
1
Z
‖PY |X(y|·)‖α, (168)
with the constant Z =
∑
y ‖PY |X(y|·)‖α. Therefore, for any
PY |X , we have
Lmaxα (X → Y ) ≥
α
α− 1 log
∑
y ‖PY |X(y|·)‖α
|X | 1α , (169)
with equality if and only if the PY |X guarantees that the
divergence function kα(PY |X=x‖Pc) are the same for all
x ∈ X , i.e., the PY |X satisfies (46).
APPENDIX G: PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Let Y1 and Y2 be the alphabets of Y1 and Y2, respectively. For
any (y1, y2) ∈ Y1×Y2, due to the Markov chain Y1−X−Y2,
the corresponding entry of the conditional probability matrix
of (Y1, Y2) given X is
P (y1y2|x) = P (y1|x)P (y2|xy1) = P (y1|x)P (y2|x).
Therefore, for α ∈ (1,∞)
Lmaxα (X → Y1, Y2)
=sup
PX
α
α− 1 log
∑
y1,y2
(∑
x
PX(x)PY1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x)α
) 1
α
(170)
=sup
PX
α
α−1log
∑
y1,y2
(∑
x
P (x)P (y1|x)αP (y2|x)α
)1
α
. (171)
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Let K(y1) =
∑
x∈X PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)α, for all y1 ∈ Y1,
such that we can construct a set of distributions over X as
PX˜(x|y1) =
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)α
K(y1)
. (172)
Therefore, from (171), Lmaxα (X → Y1, Y2) can be rewritten as
Lmaxα (X → Y1, Y2)
= sup
PX
α
α− 1 log
∑
y1,y2∈Y1×Y2(∑
x∈X
K(y1)PX˜(x|y1)PY2|X(y2|x)α
) 1
α
(173)
= sup
PX
α
α− 1 log
∑
y1,y2
((∑
x
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)α
) 1
α
·
(∑
x
PX˜(x|y1)PY2|X(y2|x)α
) 1
α
)
(174)
= sup
PX
α
α− 1 log
∑
y1
((∑
x
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)α
) 1
α
·
∑
y2
(∑
x
PX˜(x|y1)PY2|X(y2|x)α
) 1
α
)
(175)
≤ sup
PX
α
α− 1 log
(∑
y1
(∑
x
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)α
) 1
α
·max
y1
∑
y2
(∑
x
PX˜(x|y1)PY2|X(y2|x)α
) 1
α
)
(176)
= sup
PX
α
α− 1 log
(∑
y1
(∑
x
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)α
) 1
α
(177)
·
∑
y2
(∑
x
PX˜(x|y?1)PY2|X(y2|x)α
) 1
α
)
(178)
≤ sup
PX
α
α− 1 log
∑
y1
(∑
x
PX(x)PY1|X(y1|x)α
) 1
α
+sup
PX˜
α
α− 1 log
∑
y2
(∑
x
PX˜(x)PY2|X(y2|x)α
) 1
α
(179)
= Lmaxα (X → Y1) + Lmaxα (X → Y2), (180)
where y?1 in (178) is the optimal y1 achieving the maximum
in (176). Therefore, the equality in (176) holds if and only if
for all y1 ∈ Y1∑
y2
(∑
x
PX˜(x|y1)PY2|X(y2|x)α
) 1
α
=
∑
y2
(∑
x
PX˜(x|y?1)PY2|X(y2|x)α
) 1
α
; (181)
and the equality in (179) holds if and only if the optimal
solutions P ?X and P
?
X˜
of the two maximizations in (179)
satisfy, for all x ∈ X ,
P ?
X˜
(x) =
P ?X(x)P
α
Y1|X(y
?
1 |x)∑
x∈X PX(x)P
α
Y1|X(y
?
1 |x)
. (182)
Now we consider α = 1. For Y1 −X − Y2, we have
I(Y2;X|Y1) ≤ I(Y2;X). (183)
From Thm. 2, there is
Lmax1 (X → Y1, Y2)
=I(X;Y1) + I(X;Y2|Y1) (184)
≤I(X;Y1) + I(X;Y2) (185)
=Lmax1 (X → Y1) + Lmax1 (X → Y2). (186)
For α =∞, we also have
Lmax∞ (X → Y1, Y2)
=log
∑
y1,y2∈Y1×Y2
max
x∈X
P (y1|x)P (y2|x) (187)
≤log
∑
y1,y2∈Y1×Y2
(
max
x∈X
P (y1|x)
)(
max
x∈X
P (y2|x)
)
(188)
=log
∑
y1∈Y1
max
x∈X
P (y1|x) + log
∑
y2∈Y2
max
x∈X
P (y2|x) (189)
=Lmax∞ (X → Y1) + Lmax∞ (X → Y2). (190)
APPENDIX H: PROOF OF THEOREM 6
For α > 1, a function f(t) = αα−1 log t is monotonically
increasing in t > 0. Therefore, to solve maximal α-leakage
from Xn to Y n, i.e.,
Lmaxα (Xn → Y n)
= sup
PX˜n
α
α− 1 log
∑
yn
(∑
xn
P (xn)P (yn|xn)α
) 1
α
, (191)
it is sufficient to prove that
sup
PX˜n
∑
yn
(∑
xn
P (xn)P (yn|xn)α
) 1
α
= sup
PX˜i
i∈[1,n]
n∏
i=1
∑
yi
(∑
xi
P (xi)P (yi|xi)α
) 1
α
 . (192)
For a memoryless PY n|Xn with no feedback, we simplify
(192) as
sup
PX˜n
∑
yn
(∑
xn
P (xn, yn)
P (yn|xn)1−α
) 1
α
= sup∏n
i=1 PX˜i|X˜i−1,··· ,X˜1
∑
y1,··· ,yn
( ∑
x1,··· ,xn
n∏
i=1
P (yi, xi|xi−1, yi−1, · · · , x1y1)
P (yi|xnyi−1, · · · , y1)1−α
) 1
α
(193)
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= sup∏n
i=1 PX˜i|X˜i−1,··· ,X˜1
∑
y1,··· ,yn
( ∑
x1,··· ,xn
n∏
i=1(
P (yi|xi, · · · , x1)P (xi|xi−1, · · · , x1)
P (yi|xn)1−α
)) 1α
(194)
= sup∏n
i=1 PX˜i|X˜i−1,··· ,X˜1
∑
y1,··· ,yn( ∑
x1,··· ,xn
n∏
i=1
P (yi|xi)α P (xi|xi−1, · · · , x1)
) 1
α
(195)
= sup∏n
i=1 PX˜i
∑
y1,··· ,yn
( ∑
x1,··· ,xn
n∏
i=1
P (yi|xi)α P (xi)
) 1
α
(196)
= sup
PX˜1
,··· ,PX˜n
∑
y1,··· ,yn
(
n∏
i=1
∑
xi
P (xi)P (yi|xi)α
) 1
α
(197)
= sup
PX˜i
i∈[1,n]
n∏
i=1
∑
yi
(∑
xi
P (xi)P (yi|xi)α
) 1
α
 (198)
= sup
PX˜i
,i∈[1,n]
n∏
i=1
exp
{α− 1
α
ISα(X˜i;Yi)
}
(199)
where
• (193) is from the chain rule of probability;
• (194) and (195) are directly from the mechanism has no
feedback and is memoryless, respectively;
• the equality in (196) holds for memoryless sources, i.e.,
PX˜i|X˜i−1,··· ,X˜1 = PX˜i for all i ∈ [1, n];
• both (197) and (198) are from the distributive property
of multiplication;
• (199) is from the definition of Sibson MI in (6) and that
the base of the logarithm is 2.
Therefore, we have for α > 1,
sup
PX˜n
ISα(X˜
n;Y n) =
n∑
i=1
sup
PX˜i
ISα(X˜i;Yi). (200)
That is,
Lmaxα (Xn → Y n) =
n∑
i=1
Lmaxα (Xi → Yi) . (201)
For α = 1, we have
I (Xn;Y n)
=
n∑
i,j=1
I
(
Xi;Yj
∣∣Xi−1, · · · , X1, Yj−1, · · · , Y1) (202)
=
n∑
i,j=1
I
(
Xi;Yj
∣∣Xi−1, · · · , X1) (203)
=
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xi;Yi
∣∣Xi−1, · · · , X1) (204)
≤
n∑
i=1
I (Xi;Yi) (205)
where
• (202) is from the chain rule of MI;
• (203) and (204) are from the facts that the mechanism
has no feedback and is memoryless, respectively;
• from [55, (2.122)], we know that for a Markov chain
X − Y − Z, conditioning reduces mutual informa-
tion, i.e., I(X;Y |Z) ≤ I(X;Y ) with equality if and
only if I(X;Z) = 0. Therefore, since for any i ∈
[1, n] (Xi−1, · · · , X1) − Xi − Yi, the equality in (196)
holds if and only if the source is memoryless, i.e.,
PX˜i|X˜i−1,··· ,X˜1 = PX˜i for all i ∈ [1, n].
APPENDIX I: PROOF OF THEOREM 7
Given PX , the collection of stochastic matrices is denoted as
PY |X . The feasible ball BD(x) around x is defined in (51).
For the distribution dependent PUT in (53), we have
PUTHD,Lf (D)
= inf
PY |X∈PY |X
:d(X,Y )≤D
inf
QY
Df (PY |XPX‖PX ×QY ) (206)
=inf
QY
inf
PY |X∈PY |X
:d(X,Y )≤D
∑
x∈X
PX(x)Df (PY |X=x‖QY ) (207)
=inf
QY
∑
x∈X
PX(x) inf
PY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
∑
y∈Y
QY (y)f
(
PY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
)
(208)
=inf
QY
∑
x∈X
PX(x) inf
PY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
 ∑
y∈BD(x)c
QY (y)f
(
PY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
)
+
QY (BD(x))
QY (BD(x))
∑
y∈BD(x)
QY (y)f
(
PY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
) (209)
=inf
QY
∑
x∈X
PX(x) inf
PY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
( ∑
y∈BD(x)c
QY (y)f (0)
+QY (BD(x))
∑
y∈BD(x)
QY (y)
QY (BD(x))
f
(
PY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
))
(210)
≥inf
QY
∑
x∈X
PX(x) inf
PY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
(
QY (BD(x)
c) f(0)
+QY (BD(x))f
(
1
QY (BD(x))
))
(211)
=f(0)+inf
QY
∑
x∈X
P (x)QY (BD(x))
(
f
( 1
QY (BD(x))
)
−f(0)
)
,(212)
where
• (207) follows from the fact that Df (PY |XPX‖PX×QY )
is convex in (PY |X , QY ) for fixed PX ,
• (210) is directly from the hard distortion constraint
d(X;Y ) ≤ 0 such that for any y /∈ BD(x) PY |X(y|x) =
0, and therefore,
∑
y∈BD(x) PY |X(y|x) = 1,
• (211) is from the Jensen’s inequality such that∑
y∈BD(x)
QY (y)
QY (BD(x))
f
(
PY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
)
20
≥f
 ∑
y∈BD(x)
QY (y)
QY (BD(x))
PY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
 (213)
=f

∑
y∈BD(x)
PY |X(y|x)
QY (BD(x))
 = f ( 1
QY (BD(x))
)
, (214)
with equality if and only if there is a mechanism PY |X
satisfying
PY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
=
1(y ∈ BD(x))
QY (BD(x))
. (215)
Note that f : R+ → R is a convex function, such that the
function tf( 1t ) is convex in t ∈ R+. Therefore, the objective
function in (212) is convex in QY . Furthermore, in (212) the
feasible region of QY is the probability distribution simplex
over the set {BD(x), x ∈ X}. For finite supports X and Y of
X and Y , respectively, the set {BD(x), x ∈ X} is a compact,
and therefore, the infimum in (212) is achievable.
APPENDIX J: PROOF OF THEOREM 8
Given PX , the collection of stochastic matrices is denoted as
PY |X . The feasible ball BD(x) around x is defined in (51).
For the distribution independent PUT in (56), we have
PUTHD,Lmaxf (D)
= inf
PY |X∈PY |X
:d(X,Y )≤D
sup
PX˜
inf
QY
Df (PX˜PY |X‖PX˜ ×QY ) (216)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
inf
PY |X∈PY |X
:d(X,Y )≤D
Df (PX˜PY |X‖PX˜ ×QY ) (217)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
inf
PY |X∈PY |X
:d(X,Y )≤D
∑
x∈X
PX˜(x)Df (PY |X=x‖QY ) (218)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∑
x∈X
PX˜(x) infPY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
∑
y∈Y
QY (y)f
(
PY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
)
(219)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∑
x∈X
PX˜(x) infPY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
( ∑
y∈BD(x)
QY (y)
·f
(
PY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
)
+
∑
y∈BD(x)c
QY (y)f(0)
)
(220)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∑
x∈X
PX˜(x) infPY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
(
QY (BD(x))
∑
y∈BD(x)
QY (y)
QY (BD(x))
f
(
PY |X(y|x)
QY (y)
)
+QY (BD(x)
c)f(0)
)
(221)
≥inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∑
x∈X
PX˜(x) infPY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
(
QY (BD(x))
·f
(
1
QY (BD(x))
)
+QY (BD(x)
c)f(0)
)
(222)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∑
x∈X
PX˜(x)
(
QY (BD(x))f
(
1
QY (BD(x))
)
+
(
1−QY (BD(x))
)
f(0)
)
(223)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∑
x∈X
PX˜(x) g
(
QY (BD(x))
)
(224)
=inf
QY
sup
x
g
(
QY (BD(x))
)
(225)
where
• (217) and (219) follow from the fact that
Df (PX˜PY |X‖PX˜ × QY ) is linear in PX˜ for fixed
(PY |X , QY ) and convex in (PY |X , QY ) for fixed PX˜ ,
• (222) follows from the convexity of f and Jensen’s
inequality. The equality holds if and only if there exists
a mechanism PY |X satisfying (215).
• (224) results from q , QY (BD(x)) and
g(q) , qf(q−1) + (1− q)f(0). (226)
Due to the convexity of f , we have f(q−1) − f(0) ≤
f ′(q−1)
(
q−1 − 0), from which, the derivative g′(q) =
f(q−1) − q−1f ′(q−1) − f(0) ≤ 0. Therefore, the function
g in (226) is non-increasing, such that (225) is simplified as
g(q?), where q? is given by
q? , sup
QY
inf
x
QY (BD(x)). (227)
Note that in (227), the feasible region of QY is the probability
distribution simplex over the set {BD(x), x ∈ X}. For
finite supports X and Y of X and Y , respectively, the set
{BD(x), x ∈ X} is a compact, and therefore, the supremum
in (227) is achievable.
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From Thm. 1, we know that for α ≥ 1, α-leakage Lα(S;Y )
equals to Arimoto MI IAα(S;Y ). Since I
A
α(S;Y ) = Hα(S)−
HAα (S|Y ) and Hα(S) is independent of PY |S,X , to mini-
mize IAα(S;Y ) with respect to PY |S,X can be simplified to
maximize HAα (S|Y ). In addition, for α > 1, the function
g : t → α1−α log t is a monotonically non-increase function
in t > 0. Therefore, the problem in (61) can be simplified to
inf
PY |SX
:d(X,Y )≤D
∑
y∈Y
(∑
s∈S
P (s, y)α
) 1
α
. (228)
The hard distortion on X and Y in (61) determines a collection
of feasible x and therefore s for each y. We define the two
collections for each y ∈ Y as
XD(y) , {x ∈ X : d(x, y) ≤ D},
SD(y) , {s ∈ S : ∃x ∈ XD(y), PSX(sx) > 0}.
(229)
(230)
Note that both sets defined above are independent of the
privacy mechanism PY |S,X .
For α ∈ (1,∞), we have
inf
PY |SX
:d(X,Y )≤D
∑
y
(∑
s
P (s, y)α
) 1
α
= inf
PY |SX
:d(X,Y )≤D
∑
y∈Y
(∑
s∈S
(∑
x∈X
P (y|s, x)P (s, x)
)α) 1α
(231)
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= inf
PY |S,X
∑
y
( ∑
SD(y)
( ∑
XD(y)
P (s, x, y)
)α
+
∑
x/∈XD(y)
s/∈SD(y)
0
) 1
α
(232)
= inf
PY |S,X
∑
y
( ∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)α
) 1
α
( ∑
s∈SD(y)
P (s)α∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)α
( ∑
XD(y)
P (x, y|s)
)α) 1α
(233)
≥ inf
PY |S,X
∑
y
( ∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)α
) 1
α
( ∑
s∈SD(y)
P (s)α∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)α
( ∑
XD(y)
P (x, y|s)
))
(234)
= inf
PY |S,X
∑
y,SD(y)
XD(y)
( ∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)α
) 1
α−1
P (s)αP (x, y|s)(235)
= inf
PY |S,X
∑
s,x
BD(x)
( ∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)α
) 1
α−1
P (s)αP (x, y|s) (236)
≥ inf
PY |S,X
∑
s,x
P (s)αP (x|s) min
y∈BD(x)
( ∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)α
)1−α
α
(237)
=
∑
s,x
P (s)αP (x|s)
(
max
y∈BD(x)
∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)α
) 1
α−1
, (238)
where
• (234) is directly from the concavity of the function g1 :
t → t 1α (α > 1) and Jensen’s inequality. The equality
holds if and only if the optimal P ?Y |S,X achieving the
infimum satisfies that for all s ∈ SD(y),
P ?(y|s) =
∑
x∈XD(y)
P ?(y|sx)P (x|s) = P
?
Y (y)∑
s′∈SD(y)
PS(s′)
.(239)
where P ?Y is the probability distribution of Y derived
from P ?Y |S,X .
• in (236), BD(x) is the feasible ball defined in (51).
• the equality in (237) holds if and only if for any (s, x), all
y with P ?(y|s, x) > 0 lead to the same ∑s′∈SD(y) P (s′).
• the equality in (238) is from the fact that the function
g : t → t 1α−1 is monotonically non-increasing in t > 0
for α ≥ 1.
Similarly, for α =∞, we have
inf
PY |SX
:d(X,Y )≤D
∑
y
PY (y)max
s
PS|Y (s|y)
= inf
PY |S,X
∑
y
PY (y) maxSD(y)
( ∑
XD(y)
PS,X|Y (s, x|y)
)
(240)
≥ inf
PY |S,X
∑
y
P (y)
(∑
SD(y)
P (s)∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)
∑
XD(y)
P (s, x|y)
)
(241)
= inf
PY |S,X
∑
s,x
∑
BD(x)
P (s)∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)
P (s, x, y) (242)
≥ inf
PY |S,X
∑
s,x
∑
BD(x)
P (s, x, y) min
y∈BD(x)
P (s)∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)
(243)
=
∑
s,x
P (s, x)P (s)
 max
y∈BD(x)
∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)
−1 . (244)
Note that the sufficient and necessary conditions for the
equalities in (241) and (243) hold are the same as that for
(234) and (237), respectively.
For α = 1, Lα(S → Y ) = IA(S;Y ) = I(S;Y ), such that
PUTHD,Lα(D) = inf
PY |SX
:d(X,Y )≤D
∑
s,y
P (s, y) log
P (s, y)
P (s)P (y)
(245)
= inf
PY |S,X
∑
y
∑
SD(y)
(( ∑
XD(y)
P (s, x, y)
)
· log
∑
XD(y) P (s, x, y)
P (s)P (y)
)
(246)
≥ inf
PY |S,X
∑
y
(( ∑
SD(y)
∑
XD(y)
P (s, x, y)
)
· log
∑
SD(y)
∑
XD(y) P (s, x, y)∑
SD(y) P (s)P (y)
)
(247)
= inf
PY |S,X
∑
y,SD(y)
XD(y)
P (s, x, y) log
1∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)
(248)
≥
∑
s,x
P (s, x) min
y∈BD(x)
log
1∑
s′∈SD(y)
P (s′)
.(249)
Note that the inequality in (248) is from log-sum inequality in
[55, Thm. 2.7.1], and the sufficient and necessary conditions
for the equalities in (248) and (249) hold are the same as that
for (234) and (237), respectively.
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Define the distortion ball for the type-distance distortion in
(65) as
Bm(x
n) ,
{
yn : |Pxn(0)− Pyn(0)| ≤ m
n
}
. (250)
From Corollary 1, to find an optimal mechanism P ?Y n|Xn , we
need to find an output distribution Q?Y n which optimizes (58)
with xn and yn in place of x, y.
Note that for the hard distortion |Pxn(0) − Pyn(0)| ≤ mn ,
all datasets in a type class share the same group of feasible
output datasets, and this feasible group can be represented by
output type classes. Therefore, for any xn ∈ T (i) (i ∈ [0, n]),
we rewrite Bm(xn) as
Bm(x
n) = Bm(T (i)) ,
⋃
|i−j|≤m
j∈[0,n]
T (j). (251)
We define a distribution QT of type classes for outputs as
QT (T (j)) ,
∑
yn∈T (j)
QY n(y
n), for j ∈ [0, n], (252)
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such that
q? = sup
QT
min
i∈[0,n]
QT (Bm(T (i))). (253)
Note that we replace the infimum by minimum in (253) due
to the fact that the infimum over finite integers equals to
the minimum. The optimal distribution QT is determined by
bounding q∗ from above and below in (253). The upper bound
is determined by restricting the optimization in (253) to a
judicious choice of a small set of input types. The lower bound
is a constructive scheme.
We define an index set IT ⊂ [0, n] for types as
IT ,
{
l + (2m+ 1)k : k ∈
[
0,
⌈
n+ 1
2m+ 1
⌉
− 1
]}
(254)
where l = m if d n+12m+1e ≤ m+n+12m+1 , and otherwise, l = n −(
d n+12m+1e − 1
)
(2m+1). From the expression of IT in (254),
we observe that: (i) the difference between adjacent elements
is 2m+ 1; (ii) for the first and last elements,
• if d n+12m+1e ≤ m+n+12m+1 holds, the first element is m and
the last element is
m+ (2m+ 1)
(⌈
n+ 1
2m+ 1
⌉
− 1
)
=(2m+ 1)
⌈
n+ 1
2m+ 1
⌉
−m− 1 ∈ [n−m,n], (255)
due to the inequalities n+12m+1 ≤ d n+12m+1e ≤ m+n+12m+1 ;
• if d n+12m+1e > m+n+12m+1 holds, the last element is n and the
first element is
n−
(⌈
n+ 1
2m+ 1
⌉
− 1
)
(2m+ 1)
=n+ 2m+ 1−
⌈
n+ 1
2m+ 1
⌉
(2m+ 1) ∈ [0,m), (256)
due to the inequalities n+12m+1 + 1 − 12m+1 ≥ d n+12m+1e >
m+n+1
2m+1 for n ∈ Z++.
Therefore, it is not difficult to see that feasible balls of input
type classes indexed by IT are a partition of the set of all type
classes, i.e.,
Bm(T (i1)) ∩Bm(T (i2)) = ∅ i1, i2 ∈ IT ,⋃
j∈[0,n]
T (j) =
⋃
i∈IT
Bm(T (i)).
(257a)
(257b)
Therefore, the problem in (253) is bounded from above by
q?≤ sup
QT
min
i∈IT
QT (Bm(T (i))) (258)
≤ sup
QT
1
|IT |
∑
i∈IT
QT (Bm(T (i))) (259)
= sup
QT
(⌈
n+ 1
2m+ 1
⌉)−1 ∑
j∈[0,n]
QT (T (j)) (260)
=
(⌈
n+ 1
2m+ 1
⌉)−1
, (261)
where
• the inequality in (259) is from that the average probability
of Bm(T (i)) over i ∈ IT is no less than the minimal
probability of Bm(T (i)) for i ∈ IT ;
• the equality in (260) is from that the cardinality of I
defined in (254) is d n+12m+1e;
• the equality in (261) is from that for any distribution over
types T (j) with j ∈ [0, n], the sum of QT (T (j)) over
j ∈ [0, n] is 1.
To bound q? from below, we construct a distribution Q′T as
Q′T (T (j)) =

(⌈
n+1
2m+1
⌉)−1
j ∈ IT
0 otherwise.
(262)
By (257) for each i ∈ [0, n], there is a unique j satisfying
|i− j| ≤ m. Therefore, we bound (253) by
q? ≥min
i
Q′T (Bm(T (i))) (263)
=min
i
Q′T
( ⋃
|i−j|≤m
j∈IT
T (j)
)
(264)
=
(⌈
n+ 1
2m+ 1
⌉)−1
, (265)
where the equality in (265) holds because for any i ∈ [0, n],
there is only one j ∈ IT satisfying |i− j| ≤ m such that the
union in (264) has exactly one element in it.
Therefore, q? =
(⌈
n+1
2m+1
⌉)−1
and the Q′T defined in (262)
achieve the optimum in (253). Thus, we can derive an optimal
Q?Y n , which assigns the same non-zero probability to only one
dataset of each type classes indexed by IT , i.e., Q?Y n(y
n) = q?
for one yn ∈ T (j) for each j ∈ IT . Therefore, from (55)
we have the corresponding optimal privacy mechanism, which
maps all input datasets in one input type class to one feasible
output dataset with probability 1.
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For the Hamming distortion function on datasets in (70), the
feasible ball Bm(xn) of any dataset xn ∈ Xn is given by
Bm(x
n) =
{
yn ∈ Xn : dH(xn, yn) ≤ m
n
}
. (266)
For each xn ∈ Xn, the number of datasets having different
values at exactly k > 0 different positions is
(
n
k
)
(|X | − 1)k.
Therefore, the number of elements in its feasible ball Bm(xn)
is
|Bm(xn)| =
m∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(|X | − 1)i , (267)
Note that the cardinality |Bm(xn)| in (267) of a feasible ball is
independent of the input dataset. We denote the cardinality as
Nball, i.e., Nball , |Bm(xn)|. Due to the symmetric property
of the Hamming distortion on datasets in (70), i.e., for any
two datasets xn1 , x
n
2 ∈ Xn, xn1 ∈ BD(x2) if and only if x2 ∈
BD(x1), we know that each output dataset is in exactly Nball
different feasible balls (the example in Fig. 6 may help to
figure out the above relationships). Therefore,
q?= sup
QY n
inf
xn∈Xn
QY n (Bm(x
n)) (268)
≤ sup
QY n
1
|Xn|
∑
xn∈Xn
QY n (Bm(x
n)) (269)
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= sup
QY n
1
|Xn|
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yn∈Bm(xn)
QY n (y
n) (270)
= sup
QY n
1
|X |n
∑
xn∈Xn
yn∈Bm(xn)
QY n (y
n) (271)
= sup
QY n
1
|X |n
∑
yn∈Xn
NballQY n (y
n) (272)
=
Nball
|X |n (273)
where
• the equality in (269) holds if and only if for an arbitrary
pair of datasets xn1 , x
n
2 , there is
QY n (BD(x
n
1 )) = QY n (BD(x
n
2 )) , (274)
which can be satisfied by a uniform distribution over Xn,
i.e., Q?Y n =
1
|X |n .
• the equality in (272) holds because, for each yn, the
number of sequences xn where dH(xn, yn) ≤ mn is
exactly Nball.
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